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ABSTRACT 
This thesis studies how NATO has changed the way it brands itself to Russia, from a 
cooperative and humanitarian stance in 2002 toward a critical and confrontational posture 
between 2006 and 2008. The study is based on a discourse analysis of NATO’s publications. In 
the political climate following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO’s NRC established a 
cooperative relationship with the new Russian Federation, which included offers of humanitarian 
aid in food and medical care. This study shows that under the NRC, from 2002 to 2006, NATO’s 
image toward Russia continued to be one of “Strategic Partner.” Between 2006 and 2008, the 
image NATO portrayed toward Russia reverted to confrontational. The analysis of NATO’s 
change can be understood by considering the definition of brand image: a symbolic construct 
created within the minds of people and consists of all information and expectations associated 
with a product or service. 
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 I: INTRODUCTION 
 NATO’s brand and branding strategy are important to its relationships with other 
countries and organizations, helping to create a positive image of the organization as well as 
foster positive and collaborative ties with partner nations. The Alliance’s branding strategy 
encompasses all aspects of communication with target audiences and Strategic Partners, such as 
Russia. This thesis is a discourse analysis, studying the change in NATO’s branding strategy 
toward Russia through analysis of the Alliance’s transcribed communications and publications. 
The period of study focuses on the development of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), from 2002 
to 2008. By studying the changes in NATO’s branding strategy toward its Russian Strategic 
Partner, the importance of branding in international relations and NATO’s influence in the 
actions of non-member nations may become more apparent. 
 Branding strategy is creating a solid brand identity for a company, organization, etc. and 
having customers or target audiences associate the identity with the organization’s name.1 In 
other words, branding strategy is the way that an entity such as NATO portrays an image it 
wishes to represent to a target audience, such as Russia. This study observes how NATO 
represents itself to Russia, not how NATO views Russia.  International Marketing professors at 
Northwestern University Philip Kotler and David Gertner observe that “assessing a brand’s 
image and how it compares to its competitors’ images is a necessary step in designing [a] 
country’s marketing strategy”2. While NATO is not a country, but an organization including 
several countries, Kotler and Gertner’s assessment still applies. By assessing NATO’s image 
toward Russia and comparing it to other images, the Alliance may distinguish and improve its 
branding strategy toward Russia and/or other target groups. Senior Research Fellow at the 
Netherlands Institute of International Relations Peter van Ham states that “image and reputation 
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 are…becoming essential parts of the state’s strategic equity.”3 NATO’s branding and change in 
image are important parts of its reputation and value in the international political arena.  
 Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO’s branding was primarily aimed at 
showing the Soviets that NATO could deter aggression and maintain stability in the transatlantic 
region. After the Soviet collapse in 1991, NATO changed its public diplomacy toward the 
Russian Federation, emphasizing a humanitarian and supportive role. This self-image of NATO 
led to the establishment of the NRC in 2002. I hypothesize that this self-image highlighted 
NATO’s continued role of ally and supporter to Russia and any former Communist states. I 
further hypothesize that the Alliance’s image toward Russia in recent years (2006-2008) has 
reverted back to a slightly aggressive and confrontational stance. The source of the recent change 
in the NATO-Russian relationship seems to be the Alliance’s interest in and association with 
other former Communist states as well as Russia’s change in policy.  
 My fundamental argument is that, based on the organization’s own publications, NATO’s 
branding strategy toward Russia has changed throughout the development of their relationship, 
notably visible in its publications and especially in the development of the NATO-Russia 
Council. I argue that NATO’s image toward the Soviet was one of competitor and opponent in 
the balance of power in Europe. When the Soviet Union fell, NATO’s public diplomacy toward 
the Russian Federation changed to a humanitarian and cooperative nature. After the founding of 
the NRC in 2002, NATO’s image continued to be one of supporter to any former Communist 
states. I further hypothesize that the Alliance’s image toward Russia now and in recent years has 
reverted back to a critical and confrontational stance, due to Russia’s actions toward Georgia and 
other former Soviet states.  
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  Since this study is a policy and data analysis of NATO’s public diplomacy toward 
Russia, I will conduct archival research of NATO’s publications such as the NATO Review, 
NATO Update, transcriptions of press conferences and interviews with NATO officials, and 
other materials on the NATO website. The words spoken and/or written by NATO officials 
regarding Russia and the NRC are the main focus of this study. Date ranges of my archival 
research include from the beginning of the NATO-Russia Council (2002-2003), to the middle 
years of the NRC (2004-2005), to the latest years of the NATO-Russia relationship (2002-2008). 
The reason why these publications were chosen for the study is because they show not only the 
relationship between NATO and Russia, but also the branding strategy of NATO toward the 
specific target audience of Russia and how NATO’s branding strategy encompasses all forms of 
its communication. The specific date ranges of 2002-2008 were chosen to show the continuity of 
the change in the NATO-Russia relationship and to see the dynamic as it is evolving. While the 
Alliance generally brands itself in a positive light, specific images and branding are targeted to 
Russia and the NATO-Russian relationship. This thesis contributes to the topic of NATO’s 
international relations by focusing on the way the Alliance brands itself to specific nations and 
critical partners such as Russia.  
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 II: BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT 
Table 1 Timeline 
Date  Event NATO’s Image 
Late 1940s to 1950s Beginning of Cold War  NATO as opponent to Soviet 
Union 
1949 NATO is formed  
1989 Berlin Wall falls  
1990 Warsaw Pact collapses  
1991 Fall of Soviet Union  
1991 End of Cold War NATO as a supporter of new 
Russia 
1999 End of Yeltsin’s presidency  
2000 Beginning of Putin’s 
presidency 
 
1997-2002 Permanent Joint Council NATO’s positive branding 
strategy 
2002 – present NATO-Russia Council  
7 May 2008 End of Putin’s presidency  
8 May 2008 Putin becomes Prime Minister 
of Russia 
 
August 2008 Russia in South Ossetia NATO’s more critical 
branding strategy 
August 2008 NRC meetings cease  
4 
 History 
 Since its inception on 4 April 1949, the purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) has been to uphold the solidarity, freedom, and security of its member 
countries, allies, and other countries in the Euro-Atlantic region. NATO’s partnership has been 
integral in preventing war in Europe during the Cold War. The Alliance’s strategic concepts state 
that  
the dangers of the Cold War have given way to more promising, but also challenging 
prospects, to new opportunities and risks. A new Europe of greater integration is 
emerging, and a Euro-Atlantic security structure is evolving in which NATO plays a 
central part. 4 
 
Although NATO’s central role has been protector and defender of freedom, according to the 
Alliance’s website and publications, the nature of its affairs has changed to a more proactive and 
friendly stance toward the former Soviet Union and former Communist states in Eastern Europe. 
The creation of the NATO-Russia Council on 28 May 2002 formally established a positive and 
proactive relationship between NATO and Russia. 
 Before the creation of the NATO-Russia Council, NATO acquired a more defensive and 
competitive position toward the Soviet Union. NATO scholar and founding member of the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies Alastair Buchan remarked in 1960, while Russia was 
still the Soviet Union, that “Russia has a constant temptation to humiliate NATO; not to goad the 
Alliance into war, not to attempt the conquest of Western Europe, but rather to display to a 
skeptical world the real limitations of [the organization].”5 Such a position toward the Alliance 
led to its defensive image. NATO did not want Russia, or any other power, testing its abilities 
and/or mocking its importance and relevance in international relations and security. Public 
opinion analyst and author Hazel Erskine stated that NATO was formed by several European 
countries and the United States to defend Europe against Communism. She also observed that “a 
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 major purpose of NATO was to build a common military defense against possible Russian 
communist attack in Western Europe.”6 Thus, NATO’s original role was to be an opponent 
against the USSR.  
 In the height of the Cold War, NATO positioned itself as a defender of Western Europe 
against Communist Russia. Buchan stated in 1960, “it is the confrontation of the central Soviet 
threat which is the primary function of the Alliance [NATO].”7 The United States and Western 
Europe feared that the balance of power in the world would tilt toward the Soviet Union. 
Although military aggression from the Soviet Union was doubtful, the unavailability of NATO’s 
finances, military, and technological efforts due to the Korean War was a concern to the 
Alliance. Buchan affirmed that “the role of Russian force as an agent of change in the world has 
been a consistent thread in Soviet doctrine.”8 The determination and persistence of the Soviet 
superpower became an obstacle to Euro-Atlantic solidarity and security. In addition to the 
Soviets’ struggle for world influence and power, the nation’s relationship with the West was 
strained. 
 The Soviet Union’s tense relationship with the West was due to the Cold War and the 
nuclear arms race. While the Allied forces wanted to avoid war, their approaches to international 
relations differed greatly and caused the Soviet Union to react in different ways. Founding 
Director of the Atlantic Community Initiative Stanley R. Sloan observed, “European leaders 
believed, for the most part, that diplomacy, development aid, and trade policies should be the 
weapons of first resort…”9 Many Europeans felt that the United States concentrated too heavily 
on military responses to security challenges. Because the European member states of NATO 
were in closer proximity to the Soviet Union and shared common experiences from the two 
World Wars, Europe was able to obtain more tangible benefits from Détente with the Soviet 
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 Union in the form of “reduced tensions, increased trade opportunities, and improved human 
contacts.”10 The European members of NATO appeared to be more open to relations with the 
Communist regime, while the United States chose to maintain its distant and aggressive persona. 
Despite hesitation and suspicion between the United States and the Soviet Union, the two nations 
were able, along with other nations, to achieve peace talks and form treaties such as the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT I and II).     
 NATO continued to brand itself as a competitor to the Soviet Union and other former 
Soviet states. The organization did not wish to wage war on the Soviet Union, but to contain its 
influence and power in the world. NATO attempted to offset Warsaw Pact numbers, or Soviet 
allies, through acquiring and advancing its technology. While NATO tried to focus on 
technological advancements, the nuclear arms race was inevitable. As military scholars von 
Mellenthin, Stolfi, and Sobik observed, “technology tends to be overemphasized at the expense 
of command style and numbers of men and weapons”; the opposing nations thought that the 
more technologically advanced, the better and stronger the nation.11 NATO, the Soviet Union, 
and its Warsaw Pact states increased their military resources to ensure their respective national 
securities and solidarity. As a deterrent to the Soviet military and nuclear powers, the American 
and European member states began to increase and pool their nuclear resources. Yet, the 
expansion of European economies only expanded the Soviet threats.  
 Although the parties involved in the Cold War arms race remained competitors, reality 
began to take its toll. By the late 1980’s, military overextension and internal economic crises 
forced the Soviet Union to withdraw from the Cold War stalemate in Europe.12 Russia also 
began to withdraw its troops from Eastern European countries, most of which became 
democracies after the post-communist revolutions of 1989. While Russia remained a Communist 
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 nation, the needs of the fledgling democratic Eastern European states caused NATO to shift its
role from competitor to ally and peacemaker. As Sean Imrie Kay of the Mershon Center for 
International Security Studies at Ohio State University related, “NATO invited East Europ
leaders, including Soviet President Gorbachev, to…establish regular diplomatic liaison w
alliance.”
 
ean 
ith the 
13 NATO enlargement and inclusion of former Communist nations further constrained 
Soviet power in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union finally collapsed in 1991. Through several 
peace talks and collaborative committees, NATO and the new Russian Federation began to work 
together.  
 Yet, following the Cold War, internal roles and activities in NATO began to change. 
NATO members felt pressure “to free resources for other uses, like preserving welfare 
benefits…to continue to deal with security threats collectively rather than unilaterally, and above 
all to preserve NATO itself as a barrier against a renationalization of defense.”14 NATO 
struggled to balance its military and economic roles. The United States also wanted to reduce its 
role as leader and main military force in the Alliance. This brought forward the “real West 
European pillar within NATO,” according to professor and NATO expert Wallace J. Thies; a 
pillar which shared equal responsibility with the United States. Thies stated that in December 
1990, NATO began to “[enhance] the role of the European Allies with a view toward ensuring a 
full and equitable sharing of leadership and responsibilities between Europe and North 
America.”15 Yet, the member nations of NATO are not viewed as equals of power or global 
status. Former U.S. National Intelligence Officer for Europe and senior associate at the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Marten van Heuven asserted that there is equality 
within the Alliance as an “equally shared ‘acquis’ of NATO – the shared commitments to 
freedom, democracy, security and human rights, the common policies, the joint capabilities, and 
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 the common achievements during the Cold War in safeguarding Europe.”16 As NATO member 
states began incorporating fair distribution of work and responsibility among themselves as well 
as sharing in equal commitment to the Alliance, their actions paved the way for the NATO-
Russia relations to come, as well as strengthened relations within the European community.  
The European Union 
 NATO’s policy changes toward Russia reflect the relationship between the European 
Union and Russia, including the EU’s expansion into the former Eastern Soviet Bloc. The EU’s 
relationship with the former Soviet Union is important because it foreshadows NATO’s 
relationship with Russia and how NATO differs from the EU in this relationship. When the 
Soviet Union fell in 1991, the actions of the European Union revolved around the development 
of the new Russia. European political writer and Professor Timothy Garton Ash stated that, “the 
root cause of the epochal changes in Europe is the decline of the Russian empire.”17 These 
changes included European countries becoming more of a community, linked together through 
common economic, political, and security beliefs. Europe’s beginnings as a community 
underscore the importance of establishing positive and proactive relationships to show solidarity 
and Europe’s position as a long-term economic and political force. As more changes have 
occurred in Europe and more former Soviet countries become new democracies, the European 
Union has taken on greater responsibilities. In the NATO Review, Professor Adrian Pop from 
Dimitrie Cantemir University in Romania stated that “the European Union has also increasingly 
become an international actor, performing military and civilian crisis management, security 
sector reform, rule of law enforcement and border assistance missions both within and outside its 
immediate neighborhood.”18 The regions acquiring EU assistance include the Balkans, the 
Caucasus, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East, as well as Eastern Europe. While there has 
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 been competition between NATO and the EU in the area of foreign aid, NATO Secretary 
General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer acknowledges that there must be a “sustained dialogue on 
harmonizing military transformation and ensuring smooth cooperation in advanced planning and 
capabilities, combined with flexible structures for communication.”19 While the organizations 
strive toward cooperation and collaboration, both look to enlargement as well.  
 With the rise of new European democracies since the early 1990s, enlargement has 
become part of EU and NATO agenda. Professor and British House of Lords Defense 
spokesman William Wallace stated that “enlargement has now succeeded the single currency as 
the underlying ‘project’ of European integration – and the greatest challenge to European 
governments and institutions.”20 Yet, Russia has been denied membership from both 
organizations. As professor and NATO-Russian affairs expert Cynthia A. Roberts observed, 
“neither fully excluded nor embraced, Russia has been relegated to the awkward position of 
having ‘special relationships’ with NATO and the EU.”21 These “special relationships” position 
Russia as a “subordinate nonmember” without full decision-making or full partnership, yet still 
allow dialogue with the Western European and transatlantic alliances. A further obstacle lies in 
Russia’s recent economic and political power growth. According to Roberts, smaller former 
Eastern bloc countries stand to gain “large tangible and intangible economic, social, political, 
and security benefits from full membership in the EU (and NATO).”22 These smaller countries 
need the support of NATO and the EU to help them survive. Russia, on the other hand, is already 
self-sufficient and is not in need of economic, military, and/or political assistance. The 
willingness of the smaller former Eastern bloc countries to conform to EU and NATO 
membership standards shows them in a more desirable light to the organizations, whereas Russia 
still maintains a competitive and aggressive image. 
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  Inclusion in EU enlargement has become a goal for most Eastern and Central European 
countries, not only for security purposes, but also for long-term economic stability and civil 
liberties. To Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), the EU was “defined as a 
community of norms and values from which CEECs had been excluded.”23 Inclusion in a 
democratic European “family” would help former Warsaw Pact countries recover from their 
totalitarian past and other hardships. This presentation of the EU as a “civic collectivity” 
emphasizes the dichotomy of “us” versus “them”; in some contexts, Russia may be perceived as 
“them.”24 The ideal status of the EU imagined by its new members portrays a “‘community of 
values’ based on fairness, solidarity and equality between all European nations.”25 Russia’s 
exclusion from the EU and NATO denies the country these values and its place in the European 
family.  
 In the past seventeen years, since the Soviet collapse, the newly formed Russia has 
experienced economic and political growth, becoming an important player in international 
relations and using its new-found confidence to influence dealings with Western countries. 
Roberts stated that “since 2005, Moscow has signaled a willingness to use its market power in 
energy to advance Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet space and dealings with the West.”26 She 
added that Russia’s sustained economic growth rates and soaring energy prices are transforming 
Europe’s distribution of power. Deputy Director of the International Security Program at CSIS 
Julianne Smith stated that “although few would call Russia a 21st century superpower, it still 
possesses a large nuclear arsenal and has great influence in world politics on multiple fronts.”27 
Such increases in power have made the EU and NATO hesitant about including Russia in their 
enlargements, which would allow the nation greater power in membership rights and decision-
making. Fears of a defiant Russian counter power may be alleviated by the fact that the EU is 
11 
 Russia’s most important trading partner. Roberts observed that Russia’s trade with the EU is 
“remarkably three times larger than with other post-Soviet (non-EU) states,” causing then-
President Vladimir Putin to upgrade the EU on Russia’s list of priorities.28 The unstable 
relationship between Russia and the EU has made alliances like NATO more important, shirking 
its position as a “defunct” organization to the side.  
 The role of Vladimir Putin is also a major factor in Russia’s relationships. His presidency 
from May 2000 to May 2008 and current role as prime minister has shaped Russian politics and 
partnerships in a controlling, hesitant, and not-so-willing way. As president, Putin even defined 
his political ideal as “the dictatorship of the law” and a reinforcement of the “vertical of 
power.”29 With such authoritarian governmental control, Putin’s Russia can hardly be a 
formidable partner in international affairs. Scholar and author Juan Goytisolo observed of then-
President Putin that “this new tsar, with the blessing of the Orthodox Church, not only enjoys the 
resigned support of the Russian people but also an aloof attitude from Europe, which has learnt 
to turn a blind eye when substantial oil or energy contracts are being negotiated.”30 Other views 
of Putin show him as encouraging the defiance of Russia against the rest of Europe. International 
relations scholar Uri Ra’anan recounted Putin’s 2000 address to the Russian Duma: 
[For the first time in decades, Russia] faces forces whose goal is a geopolitical reshuffle. 
This country has come face to face with those who bet on separatism and a policy of ‘a 
world without Russia.’ In this context we must consolidate the state as the guarantor of 
Russia’s independence and solidarity.31 
 
 Assuming that all other nations want “a world without Russia,” Putin made Russia more 
difficult to work with and less open to outside opinion and influence. By “consolidating the 
state,” Putin hindered Russia’s relationships with other nations and organizations. Yet, whatever 
Russia’s relationship with the EU, NATO’s desire has been to bridge the gap and establish a 
partnership where real relations and dialogue may be obtained. The creation of the NATO-Russia 
12 
 Council in 2002 may be seen as an appeasement mechanism to foster a proactive relationship 
with the nation. 
NATO’s Role 
 Because of the fall of the Soviet Union and the successful solidarity of the EU, NATO 
may be seen as defunct. The Alliance has fulfilled its duties and has been replaced in some 
respects by the EU. Yet, scholars such as Carl Cavanagh Hodge, Director of the International 
Relations Program at the University of British Columbia-Okanagan, disagree. Hodge stated that 
“the formal dissolution of NATO would be less than a tragedy but more than a mistake.”32 While 
some responsibilities could be given to the EU, the termination of such a strategic alliance would 
only cause destabilization on the European continent as well as other areas of the world. Hodge 
observed that “to the extent that an international community exists, the United Nations and 
NATO are rightly regarded as core institutions.”33 In areas where there has been noted anti-
American resistance, the UN and NATO have been able to step in to provide security and 
humanitarian support. Also, despite anti-American sentiments, the United States is the main 
nation in the Alliance to provide such robust military support. Hodge asserted that “neither the 
European Union nor a looser coalition of European allies carries the requisite military heft or the 
moral authority to do more than supplement American power – even in Europe.”34 The positive 
and highly-regarded reputation that NATO, as a collective transatlantic alliance, has established 
not only assists in implementing its actions, but also helps the Alliance’s public diplomacy 
strategies in uncertain areas such as Russia. 
 Although NATO’s reputation as a “core institution” in international politics is important 
and helpful to the organization, NATO’s public diplomacy and branding strategies are still a 
priority; the Alliance must still work on its image to foster and maintain positive relationships 
13 
 with its Strategic Partners. Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the 
NATO-Russia Council, NATO’s public diplomacy efforts toward Russia have changed. The 
2002 Rome Declaration, from which the NATO-Russia Council was created, stated that  
NATO member states and Russia work as equal partners in areas of common interest in 
the framework of the NRC, which provides a mechanism for consultation, consensus-
building, cooperation, joint decision and joint action on a wide spectrum of security 
issues in the Euro-Atlantic region.35  
 
The NATO-Russia Council was established at the NATO-Russia Summit in Rome on 28 May 
2002, replacing the Permanent Joint Council. While this is not a definite mission statement 
showing how NATO legally engaged Russia into partnership, this passage of the Rome 
Declaration shows the basis on which the NATO-Russia Council was founded. The point of the 
Rome Declaration is to redefine NATO-Russia relations, “enhancing their abilities to work 
together in areas of common interest and to stand together against common threats and risks to 
security”.36 The statement, created by the heads of state and government of NATO member 
states and the Russian Federation, shows that NATO and Russia are equal partners working 
together on security issues; there is a commitment on both sides toward cooperation and 
consensus-building. 
 The changes in public diplomacy at NATO are related to the expansion of the EU into the 
former Eastern bloc and the exclusion of Russia. NATO endeavors to foster democratization in 
the former Eastern Bloc countries, rather than remain solely as a competitor against Russia. 
Hodge stated that “as NATO has expanded, in fact, Russia’s role in NATO and participation in 
the Atlantic Council has itself expanded.”37 The development of the NATO-Russia Council 
allows Russia the participation in NATO that it cannot find in the EU. Although the partnership 
started out on unequal footing, NATO has given Russia more equal responsibilities and decision-
making capabilities. NATO fosters relationships with Russia where the EU does not. Positive 
14 
 and proactive public diplomacy toward Russia, through instruments such as the NATO-Russia 
Council, improves NATO’s image to the Russian state as well as other former Soviet nations. 
NATO’s improved image to Russia is evident from the NRC’s continued involvement in 
military, humanitarian, and other security programs and assignments in and with Russia, such as 
the NATO-Russia counter–narcotics training project and NATO submarine rescue exercises. The 
overall purpose of the Council appears to be an instrument or transmitter of public diplomacy 
between NATO and Russia, where the public diplomacy is NATO’s reaching out to Russia to 
collaborate in these security projects and exercises. 
 In the past few years (2006-2008), NATO’s relationship with Russia has slightly 
changed. The Alliance’s open criticism of Russia’s involvement in the South Ossetia region of 
Georgia has hindered their relationship and the workings of the NATO-Russia Council. While 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia have remained separate enclaves from Georgia since the break up of 
the Soviet Union, journalist Peter Hart observed that “Russian forces have been present in both 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia since the early 1990s, defending the separatist regions against 
Georgian attempts to forcibly incorporate the territories.”38 War broke out in 2008, with the 
Russian Federation providing assistance to the separatist enclaves as well as attacking and 
hindering the Georgian military. The international community, including NATO, criticized 
Russia’s involvement and the nation’s relationships suffered. Focused press coverage of “the 
preferred narrative of Georgia as victim of an expansionist Russia” worsened the nation’s image 
in the international political arena.39 With this perpetuated image in the media, Russia became 
angered and the NATO-Russia relationship suffered. NATO continued its critical and 
authoritarian image toward Russia and NRC meetings ceased in August 2008.  
15 
  By studying the branding strategy of NATO toward the former Soviet Union over the 
course of the development of the NATO-Russia Council, NATO’s position as ally and supporter 
in transatlantic and global affairs may become more apparent. NATO’s relationship with Russia 
and other former Communist countries is important, not only demonstrating Russia’s growing 
world status since the fall of the Soviet Union, but also showing the Alliance’s shift from 
aggressor and competitor to ally and supporter of struggling former Soviet states – an image that 
the Alliance has been trying to project. NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division almost immediately 
changed its strategy and tactics toward the Eastern European Communist countries when the 
Soviet Union fell in 1991. The Alliance has been trying to foster a proactive relationship with 
Russia ever since the collapse; their relationship culminated in the formation of the NATO-
Russia Council in 2002. 
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 III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Theoretical Framework 
Target Audience 
 Through the detailed history of NATO and its relationships with the Soviet Union, the 
European Union, Russia, and other former Soviet states, NATO’s general brand or image as a 
core international organization dedicated to transatlantic and global security and stability 
becomes apparent. The Alliance wants to project a positive image as a core institution and as one 
committed to security issues and the balance of power. One purpose of NATO’s Public 
Diplomacy Division is to “raise NATO’s profile and to bring NATO’s achievements into public 
knowledge and debate.”40 NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division implements the branding strategy 
of promoting a positive image for the organization in order to raise its profile. While this strategy 
implies a general audience, the Alliance sets a target audience in Russia to develop its 
relationship with the nation as a Strategic Partner. With Russia as the target audience of this 
study, we may determine how the changes in NATO’s relationship with Russia over the course 
of the development of the NRC reflect the changes in NATO’s branding strategy. 
Branding Theory 
 Branding is creating a solid identity for a company, organization, etc. and having 
customers or target audiences associate the identity with the organization’s name.41 Branding 
also describes the way that an entity such as NATO portrays an image it wishes to represent. 
According to Gertner and Kotler, images represent a simplification of a large number of 
associations and pieces of information connected with a place or entity. In this case, branding 
shows how NATO is portraying itself to Russia, its target audience. While NATO’s brand is 
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 apparent to all audiences, a specific branding strategy can be targeted to a specific audience, such 
as Russia, to foster specific actions or relationships, as in the NATO-Russia Council. NATO 
projects a generally positive brand as a core international security organization, but also 
incorporates a specific branding strategy to brand itself as a proactive, supportive, and 
collaborative partner to its Russian target audience. Similar to nation branding, NATO’s 
branding strategy refers to the entity’s image and reputation. Nation branding scholar Ying Fan 
states that nation branding refers to the “application of branding and marketing communications 
technique to promote and manage a nation’s image.”42 NATO’s branding strategy, therefore, 
applies branding and marketing techniques to promote a positive and proactive image for the 
organization.  
 While nation branding is specific to nations, branding strategies may be used for any 
entity, such as a group, organization, company, or person. A brand or image may exist with or 
without any conscious efforts from the entity involved. Branding also involves self perception as 
well as perception directed at a target audience. Co-developers of Social Identity Theory Henri 
Tajfel and John Turner state that “the self concept is comprised of a personal identity component 
that includes idiosyncratic characteristics and a social identity component that includes salient 
group classifications.”43 While Tajfel and Turner’s Social Identity Theory is used primarily at 
the social psychological level, this concept may be applied to NATO’s self image and brandi
strategies toward Russia due to the Alliance’s personal identity as a peacemaker and Strategic 
Partner of Russia as well as its classification as an established core organization in international 
politics. NATO is one of a group of organizations dedicated to international security and stability 
as well as a player and partner with other nations. While NATO is part of a network of nations 
and international organizations, the Alliance also defies the “intergroup discrimination” of 
ng 
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 Russia. Ying Fan uses Tajfel and Turner’s Social Identity Theory to describe national identity, 
which relates to NATO’s perceived self-image and consequent change in public diplomacy 
toward Russia. As Fan states, “the degree of self identification and classification determines the 
behaviour of the nation both of its government and its people. Subsequently this change in 
national identity needs to be communicated to the outside worlds.”44 Thus, NATO’s identity as 
an international security organization determines its behavior and image toward Russia as a 
supporter and Strategic Partner. 
  Director of Global Governance Research Peter van Ham observes that the social power 
embedded in images and perceptions has become an important factor in international politics, 
shaping expectations as well as policies. Branding strategy was chosen for this study to focus on 
this factor. By analyzing the images, or brands, that NATO wishes to portray to Russia, changes 
in the NATO-Russia relationship and policy may be observed. The study of NATO’s branding 
strategy may also show the importance of branding in international security factors, of which 
NATO is a major player. Ham states that “it is Europe’s task to find a new, postmodern raison 
d’etre, a new security brand, which incorporates and reflects the EU’s changed role and 
ambitions.”45 While he speaks mainly of the European Union’s role and ambitions, the majority 
of the members of the EU comprise the member nations of NATO. The EU must also work 
together with NATO in maintaining security in the transatlantic region, as well as securing 
relationships with partners such as Russia. NATO’s task of transatlantic security and cooperation 
relates to its soft power efforts. Ham observes that branding, in conjunction with public 
diplomacy, is now seen as the key to underutilized soft power. Therefore, the Alliance’s soft 
power influence on the Russian relationship may be affected by its image, or brand. 
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  International relations scholar and expert Joseph Nye, Jr. defines soft power as “the 
ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.”46 He states 
that soft power arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideas, and policies. 
The attractiveness in the equality and responsibility that NATO gives Russia in the NATO-
Russia Council helps the Alliance exert influence over Russia. Nye called this dimension of soft 
power “strategic communication,” in which a campaign plans symbolic events and 
communication over a period of time to brand central themes and advance a particular poli
The continued relationship that NATO fosters with Russia as well as the further access and 
decision-making the partnership allows demonstrates the soft power NATO exerts over Russia.
Further exploration into NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division and its branding strategies may 
reveal the Alliance’s friendship, support, and mutual responsibility of Russia to be an influen
over the nation’s political and security decisions; NATO’s partnership with Russia may be a pl
for influence over the former Communist nation. Other observers, such as NATO-Russia 
relations scholars Hunter, Rogov, and Oliker, believe that NATO and Russia must recognize 
their dependence on each other to accomplish vital security tasks and to meet Euro-Atlantic 
needs. Russia’s trust in NATO and the dependability of their alliance helps increase and maint
an overall sense of European and tran
cy.47 
 
ce 
oy 
ain 
satlantic security. 
 The concepts of branding theory, Social Identity theory, the social power of images, and 
soft power are all considered in the study of NATO’s change of images toward Russia because 
they all help explain the Alliance’s self-image, projected image, the incorporation of image into a 
brand, and how branding affects the Alliance’s relationship and influence with Russia. The link 
of image and branding theory to NATO’s relationship with Russia demonstrates its public 
diplomacy. Place Branding Managing Editor Simon Anholt stated in 2006 that  
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 [public diplomacy] is in fact a subset of Nation Branding: I have always intended Nation 
Branding to consider how the nation as a whole presents and represents itself to other 
nations, whereas [public diplomacy] appears to concentrate exclusively on the 
presentation and representation of government policy to the other publics: in other words, 
the international equivalent of what is usually known as Public Affairs, or a type of 
diplomacy where the interlocutor is society at large rather than other diplomats or 
ministers.48  
 
Here, branding and public diplomacy work together to present and represent an entity, in this 
case, a nation. While Anholt speaks of nations and nation branding, the same concept applies to 
the discussion of branding strategy and NATO in this paper. Public diplomacy is a subset of 
NATO’s branding strategy. The actions and relationships in which NATO involves itself are part 
of creating a solid brand identity for the organization to project to its target audiences. Branding 
strategies are used in the context of international politics because nations and organizations need 
to gauge their image or brand in the international political arena. By considering how NATO 
presents and represents itself in international politics, the organization can better its image and its 
relationships with other nations and organizations. Branding is not only for the use of 
commercial markets; nations and organizations have just as much to benefit from using branding 
strategies.  
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 IV: RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1.  What was NATO’s branding strategy toward Russia in the beginning years of the 
NATO-Russia Council (2002-2003)? 
2. What was NATO’s branding strategy in the middle years of the NATO-Russia Council 
(2004-2005)? 
3. What is NATO’s branding strategy in the most recent years of the NATO-Russia Council 
(2006-2008)? 
4. What main themes arise in the speech and publications of NATO during these times 
periods? 
5. How do the emergent themes reflect NATO’s branding strategies toward Russia? 
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 V: METHODOLOGY 
 The study of NATO’s branding strategy through its speech and publications is a 
discourse analysis, which studies language in its relation to power and ideology. In this study, the 
language of NATO’s publications shall be related to its power in branding strategy as well as its 
relationship with Russia. Discourse analyst Norman Fairclough stated in his book, Critical 
Discourse Analysis, that discourse is the use of language seen as a form of social practice, and 
discourse analysis is analysis of how texts work within sociocultural practices.49 This study 
attempts to expose masked themes and meaning within NATO texts and how these themes 
reflect the sociocultural practices of the NATO-Russia relationship. By studying NATO’s 
discourse, the purpose or social reality of the organization may become more apparent. 
Organizational discourse scholars Dennis K. Mumby and Robin P. Clair assert that “discourse is 
the principal means by which organization members create a coherent social reality that frames 
their sense of who they are.”50 Through NATO’s discourse, the organization creates an image of 
what it is and the brand that it tries to present. This study observes how NATO represents itself 
to Russia, not how NATO views Russia. The two subjects correlate with each other, with 
NATO’s branding strategy stemming from its views regarding the nation, and this correlation 
may be inferred from my findings. Yet, NATO’s discourse only shows the projected image, or 
position, that the organization wants to represent.  
 Mumby and Clair also observe that organizations are sites of hegemony and coercion. 
NATO’s branding strategy determined through discourse analysis may show aspects of 
hegemony in the partnership between NATO and Russia as well as the Alliance’s attempts to 
coerce the nation into certain actions or decisions. While most obvious examples of hegemony 
and coercion are speech acts that are backed by sanctions (commands, laws, etc.), this study also 
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 includes less obvious coercive behavior, such as “setting agendas, selecting topics in 
conversation, [and] positioning the self and others in specific relationships.”51 NATO’s speech 
toward Russia is directly related to its coercive behavior as shown in its political and military 
commands, agenda setting in speeches and dialogue, and the role the organization plays in the 
NRC and other Russia-related partnerships. 
 The content in this study is projective content, meaning that the focus is more on the 
coder’s interpretations of the meaning of the content. Communication professors and authors W. 
James Potter and Deborah Levine-Donnerstein stated that “with projective content, the 
researcher puts precedence with the coders’ judgments and believes that the elements in the 
content are symbols that require viewers to access their pre-existing mental schema in order to 
judge the meaning in the content.”52 While there is only one person conducting the study and 
coding the materials, myself, this study seeks to expose themes in NATO’s speech toward and 
about Russia and the NATO-Russia relationship. Coding of such themes shall be applied through 
inductive measurement. This method supports the practice of emergent coding, which means that 
“the basic research question or hypothesis for a formal content analysis emerges from the units 
of observation.”53 Coding categories for the emergent themes shall take place during the analysis 
process.  
 The content of NATO’s discourse plays an important role in the determination of the 
Alliance’s branding strategy. As scholar Robert Edward Mitchell observed, “rather than 
represent an author’s true feelings, many messages are purposely biased so as to manipulate an 
audience in a predesignated way.”54 In the early years of the NATO-Russia Council, NATO 
wanted to create a positive image for itself and for its relations with Russia. In later years, and as 
Russia became more rogue in its actions toward former Soviet territories, the Alliance sought a 
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 more confrontational and critical image to convey toward Russia. The content of NATO’s 
messages helps convey certain images of the organization. Federal Communication Commission 
Senior Analyst Douglas Galbi stated that “content can provide inspiration, education, and 
degradation, it can promote social justice, better public policy, and existing cultural stereotypes, 
and it can make and break the images and fortunes of politicians and other public figures.”55 
Thus, the content of NATO speech and publications can create many images, ideas, and brands 
for the organization.  
 I will determine changes in NATO’s branding strategy through archival and documentary 
research of a limited number of the organization’s publications, which specifically deal with or 
mention Russia and/or the NATO-Russia Council. The total number of primary documents in the 
study is 142. Communication research experts Rubin, Rubin, and Piele stated that 
“archival/documentary research centers on finding, examining, and interpreting messages that 
were communicated in the past.”56 More specifically, the form of archival research conducted in 
this study is policy research, which is both historical and critical in nature. Policy research not 
only considers the origin and evolution of a particular policy, but also examines the role of 
societal agencies, government bodies, groups, and media in the status of a legal or policy issue.57 
While this study does not focus on NATO’s official policy toward Russia, the organization’s 
branding strategies may reflect official statements, strategies, and business with the nation. 
 The primary documentation used in this study includes speeches, interviews, press 
releases, news articles, manuals, and other publications from NATO or NATO officials which 
provide insight into the Alliance’s public diplomacy and branding strategy toward Russia. Data 
sampling shall include 142 NATO publications that deal specifically with Russia and/or the 
NATO-Russia Council. Specific quotes and phrases to be used in the analysis will also be chosen 
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 by their specific content related to Russia and/or the NRC. Rubin, Rubin, and Piele observed that 
“researchers often subject speeches, news stories, and television programs to content analysis to 
learn about underlying attitudes, biases, or repeating themes.”58 I attempt to discover NATO’s 
attitude(s), or branding strategy, toward Russia as well as uncover repeating themes in the 
messages’ content through discourse analysis. 
 Date ranges of my archival research include the beginning years of the NATO-Russia 
Council (2002-2003), the middle years (2004-2005), and the latest years of the NRC relationship 
(2006-2008). The specific date ranges of 2002-2003, 2004-2005, and 2006-2008 were chosen 
because the first date range portrays NATO’s initial branding strategy and image, the second 
date range portrays any gradual change in branding during the continued partnership, and the last 
date range shows the change in NATO’s branding strategy due to Russia’s relations and actions 
with other countries. While the Alliance generally brands itself in a positive light, specific 
images and branding are targeted to Russia and the NATO-Russian relationship.  
 Primary sources that provide insight into NATO’s public diplomacy tactics include 
several NATO publications: the NATO Review, NATO Update, and transcribed interviews, 
speeches, articles, press releases, and press conferences from past and present NATO officials. 
These officials are the NATO Secretary General, the NATO Deputy Secretary General, Assistant 
Secretary General of the Public Diplomacy Division, and other NATO spokespeople. All NATO 
documents and transcriptions may be found on the organization’s website. Articles written about 
the Alliance’s position and actions toward the Soviet Union and Russia may be found on other 
Internet databases provided by Georgia State University. All of the publications exhibit the 
Alliance’s relationship with Russia and the projected image that the organization wants to 
portray.   
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  One main source of NATO’s branded image is the NATO Review, the organization’s 
online journal that discusses issues that are relevant to NATO actions and endeavors. According 
to its website, the NATO Review is “published under the authority of NATO’s Secretary 
General” and is designed to “contribute to a constructive discussion of Atlantic issues.”59 While 
the NATO Review is not an internal publication, its formal presentation as “the Alliance’s 
flagship magazine” provides credibility to its content. The magazine’s publisher is Jean-Francois 
Bureau, who is also the current Assistant Secretary General of NATO’s Public Diplomacy 
Division. Bureau’s supervision implies use of public diplomacy, and perhaps propaganda, in the 
creation and distribution of materials. NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division is responsible for 
“informing the wider public about NATO’s activities and policies through contacts with the 
media, the NATO Web site and print publications, seminars and conferences, as well as NATO’s 
Science Programme.”60 Other NATO documents in this study may also adhere to this NATO 
PDD mission. Specific sections of the Review that may prove useful in NATO’s policy analysis 
include Analysis articles, that offer in-depth research; History pieces, that consider people or 
events from the Alliance’s past; Military Matters, pieces that focus on NATO’s capabilities, or 
missions and operations; and Specials, that present alternative perspectives on NATO and its 
policies.61 While the magazine may present alternative perspectives on NATO policy, the NATO 
Review would most likely not publish articles that reflect poorly on the organization, creating an 
overall positive image for the Alliance. 
 Data from the NATO publications will be analyzed by highlighting passages that indicate 
a particular position toward the Soviet Union or Russia, that identify actions that the Alliance 
conducts to or with the nation, and that show the partnership or lack thereof in the NATO-Russia 
Council. Passages will be coded by their tone (ex. in favor of Russia or against Russia) and 
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 respective theme, as well as their time period. Variability in interpretation of the passages is 
reduced due to the use of only one researcher: myself. Although this method may have 
limitations, passage interpretations will have a higher degree of consistency. Yet, the intention of 
the publication must be taken into consideration. Communication research scholars Wester, 
Pleijter, and Renckstorf stated that “the material under investigation is produced in a specific 
institutional context (e.g., a newspaper’s editorial office) and refers to a wider socio-cultural 
context.”62 The material may be read in an entirely different context, namely from the context of 
the researcher posing the research questions. While coding the highlighted passages from the 
NATO documents and newspaper articles is relatively straightforward, using only two criteria 
(tone and time period), the limitations of the method should be kept in mind. 
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 VI: SIGNIFICANCE 
 The study of NATO’s change in branding strategy is important because these practices 
suggest and reflect upon the organization’s public diplomacy and policy-making. Public 
diplomacy is generally defined as the relationship between diplomats and the foreign publics 
with whom they work, though public diplomacy scholar Paul Sharp specifies that the term is “the 
process by which direct relations with people in a country are pursued to advance the interests 
and extend the values of those being represented.”63 NATO tries to improve its relations not only 
with the Russian people, but also with Russian officials in order to advance the organization’s 
interests and extend democratic values to the nation. In this study, NATO’s audiences are the 
Russian people, politicians, and the media. NATO’s words reach all of these audiences and 
impact all NATO-Russia relationships. As stated earlier in this paper by Place Branding 
managing editor Simon Anholt, public diplomacy is a subset of branding. He stated that branding 
considers “how a nation as a whole presents and represents itself to other nations, whereas PD 
[public diplomacy] appears to concentrate exclusively on the presentation and representation of 
government policy to other publics.”64 NATO’s branding strategy considers how the Alliance 
presents and represents itself to nations and partners such as Russia, while its public diplomacy is 
a part of that strategy, focusing on its governmental relationship with Russia through its 
partnerships and the NATO-Russia Council. 
 Public diplomacy expert Jian Wang observed that “public diplomacy is part and parcel of 
foreign-policy making and has been primarily policy-driven rather than relationship-based.”65 
While this study focuses on NATO’s relationship with Russia and the image and branding 
created through that relationship, all of the aspects are part of NATO’s international policy to 
maintain security and stability in the transatlantic region. By studying the content of NATO’s 
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 speech in its public diplomacy efforts toward Russia, one may determine the image that the 
organization wants to project as well as how the image relates to its policy toward Russia. Wang 
stated that “the sine qua non of public diplomacy has been the advocacy of a country’s specific 
international policies through cultivating favorable attitudinal environment for the policies.”66 
While NATO is not a single country, Wang’s statement still applies to the organization’s 
international policies and public diplomacy tactics. NATO cultivates favorable attitudinal 
environments for its policies through its relationship-building with Russia. According to Jian 
Wang, as a national government plays the role of sponsor and communicator in public 
diplomacy, so do organizations like NATO.67 The Alliance’s projected image toward Russia and 
other former Soviet states is created to cultivate positive and proactive relationships in order to 
influence the countries’ decision-making in regards to NATO and the European continent. 
 In studying and analyzing NATO’s policy changes, one must recognize the two stages of 
foreign policy. International communication and public diplomacy expert Eytan Gilboa stated 
that the two respective interrelated stages of foreign policy are  
policy making, where policy options, positions, and tactics are considered and decided 
within the domestic environments of the parties concerned. The second phase, interaction 
and diplomacy, entails implementing policies toward other actors, presenting positions 
and demands decided in the earlier stage, and seeking solutions through confrontation, 
negotiation, or a combination of both. 68 
 
NATO’s public diplomacy toward Russia, through instruments such as the NRC, lies in the 
second phase of foreign policy. The Alliance implements its policies toward Russia through its 
involvement in the NRC and the positive steps it takes in Russia’s equal participation in the 
partnership. Study of NATO’s public diplomacy through archival research of its publications 
will help determine the Alliance’s policies toward Russia and the purpose and function of the 
NATO-Russia Council. 
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 VII: ANALYSIS 
NATO’s Image during the Beginning Years of the NRC (2002-2003) 
NATO-Russia Council 
Venue for cooperation 
At the creation of the NATO-Russia Council in 2002, NATO’s image toward Russia was 
one of ally, supporter, and equal partner. NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador 
Alessandro Minuto Rizzo stated at the NATO Defense College in October 2002 that “the 
challenge, now that we have our new NATO-Russia Council in place, is to no longer simply 
brief each other, but to start working together.”69 The NRC’s purpose was to be a venue for 
open-minded and constructive decision-making to benefit both parties. Through such 
transparency and equality, NATO portrayed itself in a positive light toward Russia and the 
former Soviet Bloc. The NATO Update stated in November 2003 that “the need for effective 
public diplomacy is particularly important today, as NATO takes on new missions and reaches 
out to new audiences.”70 In the early years of the NATO-Russia Council, NATO sought to 
engage in effective public diplomacy by creating a positive and proactive self-image. 
A year after the founding of the NATO-Russia Council, the Alliance still focused on its 
underlying, idealistic principles. Robert Bell, Assistant Secretary General and Chairman of the 
NRC Ad Hoc Working Group on Theatre Missile Defense, stated in February 2003 that “after 
decades of confrontation and mistrust, today’s new security realities present us with a unique 
opportunity to construct a NATO-Russia relationship based on mutual trust, transparency and 
shared responsibilities.”71 The present security issues required NATO and NRC members to 
view the Council as a venue for cooperation. A NATO-Russia relationship based on Bell’s 
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 principles of mutual trust, transparency, and shared responsibilities suggests that the NATO-
Russia Council must be a venue for cooperation between the two parties in order to combat 
mutual security threats. Bell even stated that in pursuing NATO-Russia interoperability, “the 
time has come for genuine cooperative NATO-Russian efforts to safeguard our security.”72 In 
the formative years of the NRC’s establishment and development, using the Council as 
cooperative venue was most desired.  
A working and proactive relationship 
 Ambassador Rizzo’s speech at the NATO-Russia Council and Defense Reform in 2002 
highlights the need for a working and proactive relationship between NATO and Russia. He calls 
for a defense reform policy that is “open-minded, constructive, and to our mutual benefit.”73 
Rizzo affirmed that the newly-formed NATO-Russia Council is the venue for such cooperation. 
The NRC provides “a good venue to share and use the experience of NATO as an organization, 
and on a national basis, and learn from each other’s experiences in the area of defense reform.”74 
Not only is the NRC a fitting venue to specifically work on NATO-Russia relations, but is also a 
forum where both parties can learn from each other to foster mutual understanding and a 
successful partnership. 
 Guillaume Parmentier of the NATO Review had a similar view to that of Ambassador 
Rizzo. Parmentier noted in the summer of 2002 how much “the experience of joint participation 
in crisis-management operations in the Balkans has contributed to improving relations between 
NATO and Russia.”75 The NATO-Russia Council helped create opportunities for joint ventures 
in international security operations. While working together on such operations, including crisis 
management in the Balkans, Parmentier stated that relations between NATO and Russia 
improved. He also asserted that “cooperation should be extended beyond politics into the 
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 military sphere, including planning. From this point of view, frequent and repeated joint 
exercises are an absolute must.” 76 Only through repeated collaboration in a variety of security 
measures can a relationship between the two parties flourish. As a cooperative venue, the 
NATO-Russia Council provided opportunities for such proactive engagement. 
Equality 
 Ambassador Rizzo’s statements and wishes for NATO-Russia relations through the 
establishment of the NATO-Russia Council were affirmed by then-NATO Secretary General 
Lord Robertson in December 2002. At the Royal Society of Edinburgh, Robertson gave a speech 
on “A New Russian Revolution: Partnership with NATO.” While the Council was relatively 
new, actions were already being taken to engage both sides in a proactive partnership. Lord 
Robertson observed that “the way [the NRC] has done business in its first six months 
demonstrates that we truly have achieved a revolution in NATO-Russia relations.” 77 He focused 
on the NRC’s marked change from the “19 versus one” arrangement of the Permanent Joint 
Council to a proposed equal partnership between NATO member states and the Russian 
Federation. Shortly after the NRC’s creation, NATO and Russia also began working together on 
assessments of Euro-Atlantic terrorism and peacekeeping missions in the Balkans. The newfound 
equal partnership of the NATO-Russia Council encouraged both parties to work together and 
address important issues on the European continent. Robertson’s comments gave NATO the 
image of a partner eager to form a lasting and productive alliance with the Russia. 
 While Lord Robertson maintained that the new NATO-Russia Council is an equal 
partnership between the two parties, Guillaume Parmentier of the NATO Review differed slightly 
in his opinions. He observed in 2002 that “the creation of a NATO-Russia Council in May is a 
major step in the right direction and it will be important to deepen relations without giving 
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 Russia a veto over future NATO action.” 78 Here, the NATO-Russia Council appears to limit 
Russia’s decision-making rights and still safeguards NATO action. Lord Robertson’s view shows 
that the new NATO partnership is better than the “19 versus 1” configuration of the Permanent 
Joint Council, but does not mention the limited voice of Russia in vetoing NATO decisions. 
While the new partnership is not truly equal, the arrangement of the NRC is better than the Cold 
War relationship and the condescending inequality of the Permanent Joint Council.  
 James M. Goldgeier of the NATO Review reflects Parmentier’s view in his Spring 2002 
article. He stated that “while optimism for the prospects of NATO-Russia relations has probably 
never been greater, the core problem that existed in the PJC will be difficult to overcome in a 
new body, given that NATO does distinguish between members and non-members.” 79 
Goldgeier highlighted the miscommunications involved in reaching PJC agreements; Russia was 
viewed by NATO as undermining NATO consensus, while NATO seemed to only want Russian
approval of already decided resolutions. He acknowledged that NATO-Russia equality will be 
difficult to achieve. While the two parties may participate equally in joint security operati
NRC decision-making may not be as equal. Goldgeier identified one condition to make the
NATO-Russia Council work more successfully than the Permanent Joint Council. He asserted 
that “new Russian personnel at NATO with both instructions and the ability to engage 
constructively with their counterparts will be important for ensuring that the new NATO-Russia 
body is more effective than its predecessor.” 
 
ons, 
 new 
80 In his statement, he advised Russia to take the 
initiative in maintaining equality in NRC decision-making. While NATO provided an impetus 
for a new NATO-Russia partnership, Russia would need to hold the organization accountable in 
its commitment to a truly new and equal relationship. 
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NATO-Russia Partnership 
A “new era” 
While the NATO-Russia Council provided a venue for NATO-Russia relations, a real 
partnership began to grow. As then-NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson stated in 
December 2002,  
To my mind, the partnership between NATO and Russia today marks the end of a dark 
century for Europe – a century which, in a very real sense, began with the storming of the 
Winter Palace in 1917, and ended with the collapse of the World Trade Center in 
September 2001. 81 
  
Lord Robertson acknowledged the NATO-Russia partnership as the beginning of a new era; the 
dark days of the Cold War were over and a new dawn in NATO relations had begun. Throughout 
his speech to the Royal Society of Edinburgh, Robertson outlined the history and transformation 
of Russia, from the Bolshevik Revolution to the Cold War to September 11, 2001, where the real 
partnership between NATO and Russia began to take root. As partners against the international 
terrorist threat, Lord Robertson stated that “the Alliance truly had changed.” 82 As a changed 
NATO, the organization could also change international politics. 
 Lord Robertson highlighted in another 2002 speech that not only has a new era in NATO-
Russia relations begun, but a new era for NATO was also underway. He observed that Russia 
had changed over the past 10 years, that the Alliance “has reached out to new partners in Europe 
in a co-operative and trusting way. It has given a secure home to new democracies…” 83 
Robertson suggested that NATO’s new behaviors toward new partners in Europe have signaled a 
new era for NATO’s international relationships and promotion of democracy and security. No 
longer a Cold War, anti-Communist opponent, NATO could usher in an era of proactive 
relationships with new strategic European partners. Lord Robertson also remarked that “as 
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 NATO is changing, so too must the NATO-Russia relationship.” 84 The creation of the NATO-
Russia Council denoted a new era for the two parties as well as for their relationship.  
An investment 
 In another speech, Lord Robertson related the NATO-Russia partnership to a business 
investment. He surmised that NATO is “still in the investment phase, but…can see that the 
revenues will soon start pouring in.” 85 This metaphor predicts that while the NATO-Russia 
partnership may not be very active or beneficial to the Alliance at that time, the new relationship 
will soon produce favorable outcomes in security measures for the organization. Both NATO and 
its officials trusted that the NATO-Russia Council would become a successful partnership and 
that Russia has the potential to be a contributing ally in NATO operations. NATO’s image as a 
trusting partner in its engagement with Russia may contribute to Russia’s interest in the Council. 
Images of strength and power 
 The new NATO-Russia partnership in the NATO-Russia Council shows strength in both 
parties. Secretary General Lord Robertson asserted in December 2002 that “in the past, Russia 
and the NATO countries were on opposite sides…But now, Russia and the NATO nations are 
partners in the world, a dangerous world, today against common threats and common enemies.” 
86 As partners against the enemies that threaten the transatlantic region, specifically the European 
continent, NATO and Russia gain images of strength and power. Prior to the NATO-Russia 
Council, the Alliance still achieved power and respect in the international community, but was 
still occupied with competition and defense against the Soviet Union. As partners, NATO’s 
image improves and shows Russia and other former Soviet nations its strength. 
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  Not only does NATO garner images of strength and power from its new partnership with 
Russia, but the NATO-Russia Council itself acquires credibility, strength, and power in its 
presence. Tom Donnelly of the NATO Review stated in 2003 that  
the NATO-Russia Council brings Moscow itself into the inner chambers of Western 
security policy-making. And, if anything, the relationship with Russia will prove an 
additional force for European engagement in stabilizing the Islamic world, where Russia 
has legitimate security concerns. 87 
 
By associating with and gaining the trust of the increasingly powerful Russia, the NATO-Russia 
Council obtains more power and control over a greater area of the European continent. Not only 
the NRC, but also NATO itself may have more influence and power in international security, 
including stability in the Middle East and other Islamic nations. The potential for control over 
greater areas of land incorporated with a promising partnership with Russia gives NATO an 
increased image of strength and power in the realm of international relations and security. 
 Yet, Donnelly also distinguished NATO’s image between two major players in the 
Alliance, United States and the United Kingdom, and the European continent. He observed that 
“for the United States, and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom, NATO was a power-
projection mission, while for continental Europe…it was an issue of homeland defense.” 88 
These two images of NATO carry over from the Cold War, but may still be relevant during the 
creation and formative years of the NATO-Russia Council. The Alliance’s image of strength and 
power may be determined through association with any of its member states, including the 
United States – one of its main military providers. While Donnelly associated the United States 
and the United Kingdom with NATO’s power projection, he observed that continental Europe 
viewed the Alliance as an issue and proponent of homeland defense. During the Cold War, this 
image was plausible, but since the decline of the Soviet Union, such an image may have shifted. 
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 Europe’s security threat(s) from Russia may no longer be an issue, but the continent’s concern 
over terrorist threats may encompass the image.  
 Czech President Vaclav Havel called for NATO to review its identity and the role it 
wishes to play in the world. He stated in the Spring 2002 issue of the NATO Review that the 
Alliance must “reaffirm its position as a key pillar of international security and serve as a model 
of an organization committed to the defense of human liberty.” 89 While Havel asserted that 
NATO must review its current identity and determine what role it wants to play in international 
politics, his remarks referring to the Alliance as a “key pillar of international security” and a 
“model of an organization” distinguish NATO as a powerful institution in international relations. 
NATO may need to reaffirm its identity and role in transatlantic security, but the mention and 
association of the Alliance with any images of power and/or strength show that NATO is moving 
in the right direction in its branding strategy as an organization of power and strength. 
Transparency 
Gaining trust from Russia 
 As the NATO-Russia Council progressed in building its partnership between NATO and 
the Russian Federation, the Council required transparency between the two parties. NATO 
specifically needed to change its image to a more open stance in order to gain trust from Russia. 
NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Alessandro Minuto Rizzo observed in October 
2002 that  
In essence, NATO-Russia cooperation on defense reform is an exercise in transparency 
and openness. An exercise in putting problems on the table, and examining how we can 
learn from each other. An exercise in sharing our experiences, our expectations, perhaps 
even our frustrations. And an exercise, therefore, in building confidence between us, and 
in promoting the interoperability of our forces and strengthening the NATO-Russia 
relationship. 90 
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 Rizzo acknowledged that transparency is crucial to NATO’s relationship with Russia and to the 
interoperability of their forces. A transparent image for NATO would help the organization in all 
of its relationships and in the promotion of its actions and policy. A more open relationship 
would also show that the Alliance is dedicated to a lasting and long-term relationship with 
Russia and any other partners. While Ambassador Rizzo promoted transparency in the NATO-
Russia Council, he also accepted that all nations are independent and have the right to operate 
without regard to the Alliance. He stated that “there is nothing wrong with such individuality, as 
long as it is accompanied by transparency.” 91 Independence and individuality are welcomed by 
NATO, but transparency must be present in order for its relationships to flourish. 
 NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson also understood the importance of transparency 
in gaining trust from Russia. In November 2002, Robertson held several meetings with then-
President Vladimir Putin regarding the upcoming NATO Summit in Prague. After briefing the 
president on subjects from NATO enlargement to new threats, Lord Robertson stated that “none 
of our decisions in Prague will be in any way contrary to any of Russia’s vital security interests. 
In my capacity as the Chairman of the NATO-Russia Council, I also briefed the President on the 
work of the Council and on its extremely good collective record.” 92 By showing President Putin 
the accomplishments of the NATO-Russia Council and demonstrating the non-threatening nature 
of the decisions made at the Summit, Lord Robertson was being open about all NATO activities 
and relations. The Alliance sought to maintain an open and transparent relationship with Russia 
by disclosing extensive information about the NRC and the Prague Summit. 
 Lord Robertson continued to show his commitment to transparency with Russia in a 2003 
Krasnaya Zvezda article. The article not only contains positive content regarding the NATO-
Russia relationship, but its publication in a Russian Ministry of Defense journal shows the efforts 
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 of the Alliance to reach out to the Russian government and people. Robertson described the 
NATO-Russia relationship as a “special relationship [that] began as a way to build mutual 
confidence and trust through dialogue.” 93 Here, he acknowledged that open dialogue is the way 
to gain trust from Russia, emphasizing the mutual aspect of communication and building trust; 
Russia must also participate in open dialogue to gain trust from NATO. Robertson concluded his 
article by stating that “closer relations with Russia have become a central element of NATO’s 
broad transformation agenda.” 94 As the Alliance transforms its image from Cold War opponent 
to Russian ally, close relations with the nation have become a main priority in their actions and 
decision-making. 
Interoperability of forces 
 Stemming from the concept of gaining trust and open dialogue between NATO and 
Russia comes the interoperability of forces. In order to strengthen the NATO-Russia relationship, 
partnered activities as well as dialogue are needed. Lord Robertson noted in 2003 that  
Russia’s contribution to [the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia], alongside NATO, 
demonstrated to all that the Euro-Atlantic community was united in its determination to 
bring peace to the Balkans. It also demonstrated the potential of cooperation between 
Russia and the North Atlantic Alliance in bringing lasting solutions to threats to our 
common security. 95 
   
The interoperability of Russian and NATO forces in maintaining peace and security in Bosnia 
suggests that the two parties must engage in transparent dialogue and activities in order to 
accomplish such a monumental task. While all efforts may not have been, in actuality, the most 
transparent, the general attempt demonstrates willingness between Russia and NATO to progress 
their relationship in a positive way. 
 Other NATO officials also perceived the interoperability of NATO and Russian forces 
and stress its importance in maintaining an open relationship as well as promoting security in the 
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 transatlantic region. Paul Fritch, head of the Russia and Ukraine Relations Section in NATO’s 
Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, stated in the Autumn 2003 issue of the NATO 
Review that cooperation between the two parties “has not been a one-way street. In October 
2003, for example, NATO officers participated for the first time in a Russian military training 
program, a course focused on air crew survival techniques.” 96 He added that after years of 
awkward, formal “partnership,” NATO Allies and Russia finally felt like partners. Thus, positive 
sentiment and aspirations for the relationship and the NATO-Russia Council cannot be the only 
ingredients to a healthy and proactive partnership. 
Positive NATO Image 
An experienced NATO 
 With NATO’s relationship with Russia in a new phase, the organization exhibited itself 
in a positive fashion. NATO and its officials not only recalled positive aspects of the 
organization’s history and experience, but also focused on the Alliance as a proactive and 
integral part of the NATO-Russia Council. Ambassador Alessandro Minuto Rizzo offered that  
we would like to make our accumulated knowledge and know-how available to assist 
Russia, in the best way we can, in defense reform. We must, therefore, move forward 
with a meaningful dialogue on military reform, to learn from each other’s experience, and 
have confidence that we all have the right capabilities to face together the threats of today 
and tomorrow. 97  
 
Rizzo accentuated NATO’s experience in defense reform and international politics, creating an 
image of a wise, experienced, and helpful NATO. While he affirmed that NATO and Russia 
must work together and learn from each other to face international threats, his speech mimics the 
humanitarian dialogue of NATO’s post-Cold War image. Through Rizzo’s speech, NATO 
maintained its positive image of humanitarian supporter and experienced partner. 
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  Not only did NATO focus on its past accomplishments and experience in international 
security and politics, but the organization also emphasized its current activities and 
commitments. Christopher Bennett, editor of the NATO Review, noted in Autumn 2003 that 
“today, barely a week goes by without either the NATO Secretary General meeting with the head 
of another international organization or the leader of a Partner country, or a visit to Alliance 
Headquarters by an individual of similar standing.” 98 This statement not only depicts the 
organization and its officials as busy in the world of international politics, but also shows that 
NATO is an important institution; World leaders want to meet with the Secretary General and 
visit NATO Headquarters. Bennett added that “NATO has even developed effective working 
relationships with international financial institutions and non-governmental organizations 
working in crisis areas of the world.” 99 Due to the Alliance’s experience with a wide array of 
international institutions, the organization has gained prominence among other organizations and 
coalitions as well as nations around the world. Years of experience coupled with a prominent and 
relevant NATO of today portray the institution in a most favorable light. 
“Victory” in enlargement 
 Secretary General Lord Robertson quoted the Wall Street Journal in 2002 to support 
NATO’s image and accomplishments, saying, 
A Wall Street Journal article a few days ago said that, by inviting seven countries to join, 
‘NATO has achieved the greatest victory in the five decades of its existence, by finally 
erasing the effects of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and the Yalta Agreement, which had 
shackled Europe for half a century.’ 100 
 
The Secretary General referred to the new NATO membership of Bulgaria, Slovakia, Romania, 
Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the spring of 2002. The accession of these former 
Soviet Bloc countries portrayed NATO as overcoming the power of the Soviet Union and the 
Cold War. Exalting NATO’s “victory” and power, Robertson suggested that the Alliance 
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 achieved its initial purpose – to counterbalance the Communist Soviet Union and maintain peace 
and security on the European continent. Inferring that NATO outlasted the Soviet Union and 
Communism in Europe, Lord Robertson gave NATO a positive image. 
 Yet, Lord Robertson is not the only NATO official to offer such praises. Assistant 
Secretary General to NATO’s Political Affairs Division, Günther Altenburg, noted in the 
Summer 2002 issue of the NATO Review that through the admission of former Warsaw Pact 
nations into the Alliance, NATO “played a key part in overcoming Europe’s division.” 101 He 
observed that the initial membership of three former Soviet nations would leave open the option 
for future invitations of other former Soviet states. The beginning process of enlargement 
supposedly led to the democratization of other former Warsaw Pact nations; NATO membership 
was so important as to change the political make-up of Eastern Europe. Thus, Altenburg 
suggested that NATO’s victory in enlargement is also a victory in the democracy of the 
European continent. 
While NATO officials praised the organization’s “victory in enlargement,” they also 
observed that the new NATO members must contribute to and add value to the organization. 
Lord Robertson stated in December 2002 that “any new members of NATO have to add value, 
both militarily and politically to the work of the Alliance. And we will only invite countries to 
become members if they satisfy both of these tests.” 102 In this statement, NATO suggested that 
its intent in enlargement was not to acquire former Eastern Bloc states solely to counter the 
Communist threat. While the new NATO members must uphold the principles of democracy, the 
Alliance does not mention that these acts are in competition with the former Soviet Union. In 
another speech, Lord Robertson observed that “once upon a time, most people in the West 
looked at Russia as part of the problem. No more. Today, Russia is very much part of the 
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 solution.” 103 NATO’s success in enlargement is a positive step for the organization in the 
promotion and maintenance of security, but the Alliance also wants Russia to be a part of the 
process. As NATO reaches out to Russia and other former Communist states, the organization 
portrays itself positively. 
An integral partner for Russia 
 Lord Robertson mimicked Ambassador Rizzo’s image by focusing on NATO’s 
supportive humanitarian image as well. He stated in 2002 that “few people would have guessed, 
in 1990, how integral a role NATO would play in [bringing Russia in from the Cold and into the 
European family of nations].” 104 Here, Robertson concentrated on the Alliance’s shift from 
Soviet opponent to Russian aid, being the integral force in Russia’s acceptance back into the 
European community. Without NATO, Lord Robertson inferred that Russia could not have 
achieved a place in the current European community and partnership. Through his inference, 
NATO’s image as an integral partner for Russia in the NATO-Russia Council is strengthened.  
 NATO officials also mentioned the interest that other countries have in NATO 
partnership. NATO Review editor Christopher Bennett observed in Autumn 2002 that “as the 
Alliance continues to transform itself to meet the security challenges of the 21st century and 
moves beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, interest in partnership with NATO grows.” 105 He 
mentioned China’s interest in collaborating with the organization. By announcing the interest of 
other major international players in relationships with NATO, Bennett’s statement shows Russia 
and other potential allies that the Alliance is a hot commodity in international affairs; NATO is a 
core political institution that can enhance a country’s political, military, and/or security 
ambitions. 
 
44 
 NATO vs. Russia 
Russia’s Communist past 
 NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson also focused on Russia’s Communist past 
when delineating the organization’s history and relationship with the nation. In 2002, he 
described Europe and the world as divided by the Cold War “into two massive armed camps: one 
threatening to export its repressive model through intrigue or violence; the other a group of 
democracies determined to protect their security and their values.” 106 Although Robertson 
discussed the fallen Soviet Union, his remark still referred to the current Russia. His words 
painted the former Soviet Union as an evil and threatening opponent to the Alliance. While he 
associated Russia with a negative connotation, his remark painted NATO in a positive light. 
Robertson grouped NATO with nations striving to protect democracy and international security, 
those who were against the Soviet Union. Such speech may improve NATO’s image toward its 
allies and member states, but may also hinder its relationship with the current Russian 
Federation. The Soviet Union may be in Russia’s past, but the nation is trying to make its way as 
a new democracy. 
 Lord Robertson was not the only NATO official to bring up Russia’s Communist past. 
Günther Altenburg also referred to NATO’s relations with the former Soviet nation. In his 2002 
NATO Review article, Altenburg described the hesitance and suspicion of NATO members 
toward the recently fallen Soviet Union. He stated that “when the Cold War ended – not without 
considerable intra-Alliance squabbles over the question of whether Mikhail Gorbachev was a 
genuine reformer – the Alliance could look back with a sense of achievement.” 107 Altenburg 
suggested that although NATO members questioned the reformation of Gorbachev and the 
former Soviet Union, the Alliance was strong enough and confident enough to engage in 
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 relations with the nation. As he correlates Russia with suspicion, he also associates NATO with 
integrity and trust. 
NATO alienating Russia 
 While NATO marked the creation of the NATO-Russia Council in 2002 as a big step in 
its relations and dealings with Russia, the organization sometimes characterized the nation in an 
alienating fashion. Lord Robertson stated that the advancement in NATO-Russia relations 
“proved that Russia is now ready to take her place as a fully, equal and trusting partner in Euro-
Atlantic security.” 108 His tone suggested that NATO engaged in unequal partnerships with 
Russia, such as the Permanent Joint Council, because Russia was not ready or not worthy to gain 
the organization’s trust in security procedures and initiatives. While the NRC grants Russia equal 
representation and equal decision-making in its actions, this comment alienates the country as an 
“other” that still needs to prove its worth and reliability in a turbulent era in international 
security. 
 NATO also alienated Russia by criticizing and questioning the nation’s policy on certain 
humanitarian and possibly destabilizing circumstances in former Soviet territory. Paul Fritch 
stated that the “Allies continue to voice concerns about the prolonged crisis in Chechnya – its 
humanitarian consequences, its potential to destabilize neighboring states, and certain aspects of 
Russian policy toward the breakaway republic.” 109 By calling attention to Russian policy and 
actions toward the former Russian province, NATO may have alienated the nation and/or 
hindered decision-making and participation in joint security ventures. 
NATO protecting democracy and international security 
 While some of NATO’s dialogue about Russia portrayed the nation in a less than 
favorable fashion, the organization continued to focus on its own accomplishments in protecting 
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 democracy and international security. NATO Review editor Christopher Bennett observed that in 
the area of practical cooperation, “NATO has forged increasingly effective partnerships with 
other international institutions in the interest of eventually achieving self-sustaining peace 
processes.” 110 While the Alliance maintained a relationship with the progressing former Soviet 
Union, the organization also reached out to other nations, organizations, and strategic partners to 
maintain peace in the transatlantic region and abroad. Bennett suggested that NATO continued to 
live up to its founding ideals of protecting democracy and international security.  
Demeaning Russia’s concerns about NATO enlargement 
 In addition to NATO’s focus on Russia’s Soviet past, the organization also demeaned the 
nation’s concerns about enlargement. Lord Robertson commented that “only completely 
paranoid people in Russia could seriously argue today that NATO enlargement is about 
‘encircling’ Russia.” 111 His remark gave the organization an image of authority over Russia, as 
knowing better than the non-member nation. NATO’s elitist language presented the organization 
as an authority figure, while attempting to portray Russia as paranoid, ridiculous, and lesser. 
Although NATO may succeed in its image as an authority figure, the demeaning of its Russian 
partner jeopardizes the organization’s relationship as well as diminishes its own image and 
reputation. 
 Other NATO officials demeaned Russian concerns about the organization’s enlargement 
and also advised the nation on how to maintain their relationship with the Alliance. Dmitri 
Trenin, writer and deputy director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, wrote in the Spring 2002 
issue of the NATO Review that  
Russia has neither the power nor the influence to block NATO membership for other 
European countries. Moreover, should it try to do so, it would most certainly fail. And the 
more it tried, the more counterproductive such a policy would likely be. 112 
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 Trenin implied that Russia’s concerns or objections to NATO enlargement do not matter and will 
not affect NATO decisions. He stated that any opposition to NATO enlargement on Russia’s 
behalf would fail, indicating that the only way to a successful NATO-Russia relationship is 
through compliance with NATO policy and decisions. Trenin also wrote that the bulk of the 
Russian political establishment resented NATO’s “eastern march” because “it eats away at their 
self-esteem and the traditional notion of Russia as a great power.” 113 He associated Russia’s 
concerns and opposition to that of an inferiority complex. He implied that Russia craves the 
power and stature it once had as the Soviet Union and that the nation does not want the Allied 
powers (i.e. NATO) to add former Soviet states to their membership. 
NATO’s Public Diplomacy 
NATO’s commitment to positive communication 
 All images of NATO reflect the organization’s public diplomacy and the Public 
Diplomacy Division (PDD). Simon Walker, Director of Corporate Communication at Reuters 
and the keynote speaker at a 2003 NATO public diplomacy workshop asserted that “in [today’s] 
environment, no organization can afford to be bad at communicating…public institutions exist 
only by public consent and you need to take with you the hearts and minds of the people who 
consent to your existence.” 114 Walker’s remark and the Alliance’s public diplomacy workshop 
emphasized NATO’s commitment to positive communication, not only with governments, but 
also with other foreign publics. The creation of the NATO Public Diplomacy Division also 
shows the Alliance’s commitment to positive communication, especially concerning the NATO-
Russia Council. The NATO Update states that the PDD “was created this year [2003], as part of 
an effort by the Alliance to strengthen its public diplomacy and better communicate the current 
transformation of NATO.” 115 The recent creation of the PDD proves that NATO not only wants 
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 to improve its communication with others, but also that the Alliance wants to convey a better and 
proactive image to the international community. 
 In specific relation to the NATO-Russia Council, the Alliance’s positive communication 
involves engaging Russian personnel. James M. Goldgeier stated in 2002 that “new Russian 
personnel with both instructions and the ability to engage constructively with their counterparts 
will be important for ensuring that the new NATO-Russia body is more effective than its 
predecessor.” 116 Here, Goldgeier suggested that Russian members of the NRC be more involved 
and implied that their NATO counterparts must be willing to openly engage them. Only through 
positive engagement can the newly-formed NATO-Russia Council surpass the failed 
communication efforts of the Permanent Joint Council. 
Need for a new NATO image 
 The need for a new image and new public diplomacy skills was reiterated by then-
Secretary General Lord Robertson. He observed that 
40 years of antagonism is a long time indeed. These years have shaped perceptions of 
each other that are very difficult to shed. And so, even after the Cold War had ended, we 
remained prisoners of these old images. 117 
 
NATO’s image of aggressor and opponent during the Cold War was difficult to change, so the 
creation of a specific public diplomacy department was needed. Robertson acknowledged the 
organization’s image as Russian opponent. The end of the Cold War and the establishment of the 
NATO-Russia Council with a new NATO-Russia relationship called for the portrayal and 
emphasis of NATO in a new light. 
 The 2003 Head of the NATO Countries Relations Section in the Public Diplomacy 
Division, Stefanie Babst, fully defined the organization’s public diplomacy policy. She stated 
that  
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 NATO’s Public Diplomacy policy is very much threefold. It’s first of all about informing 
the public about the Alliance’s broad agenda, and secondly about communicating with 
different opinion-formers in our countries. And it’s certainly about promoting NATO vis-
à-vis the outside world. 118 
 
While promoting a positive NATO image, the organization’s public diplomacy policy intends to 
announce its agenda to various publics, including governments, “opinion-formers,” and the 
outside world. The establishment of NATO’s PDD and the rejuvenation of its relationship with 
Russia through the NATO-Russia Council created the need for better communication and an 
improved image for the Alliance. 
 James M. Goldgeier also discussed NATO’s need for a new image, but in reference to 
NATO enlargement and the maintenance of international security. He observed that “if 2002 
brings both an enhanced relationship with Russia as well as a big increase in members, then the 
future role of the Alliance may be profoundly affected.” 119 With a new role in international 
security and politics comes the need for a new image. The Alliance already demonstrated a shift 
from Soviet opponent to Russian partner since the collapse of the Soviet Union. With the 
acquisition of numerous former Eastern Bloc countries and a new partnership with Russia in the 
NATO-Russia Council, the Alliance’s Communist threat and concerns have diminished. 
Goldgeier advised NATO to “engage in any real soul-searching about what role members expect 
NATO to play in the coming years as an alliance in responding to existing and future threats.” 120 
Terrorism and other concerns may now shape the new role and new image that NATO must 
project in the global arena. Through open engagement with Russia, new NATO members, and 
other strategic partners, the Alliance may develop a new image as an organization committed to 
its relationships and determined to maintain stability and security around the world.  
 Secretary General Lord Robertson reinforced this stance toward NATO’s role and image. 
In a 2003 NATO Review article, he asserted that  
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 we [NATO] need to redouble efforts to bring the wider public along. One of the 
characteristics of this new security environment is that our security policies — and our 
institutions — are changing faster than the perceptions of our publics. As a result, the 
task of explaining what NATO is and what it is doing is becoming ever more demanding. 
We must therefore exercise additional effort to ensure that public understanding of the 
new NATO remains widespread, strong and supportive.121 
 
As Goldgeier focused on the need for a new NATO image, Lord Robertson emphasized the 
realities of NATO’s image. He recognized that NATO’s public diplomacy efforts were not 
keeping up with the perceptions of the public.  NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division needed to 
put forth additional effort to project the organization’s new role and image through the NATO-
Russia Council. 
NATO’s Image from 2004-2005 
NATO’s Public Diplomacy 
Transparency 
 At the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, Stefanie Babst from NATO’s Public Diplomacy 
Division showed how the organization reached out to the public, demonstrating the Alliance’s 
capabilities in reaching out to target audiences and creating positive self images. She stated that 
NATO’s public diplomacy campaign was to “[make] the Summit as transparent to the overall 
public, reaching out to the public and explaining to the public…what actually will be achieved at 
the Summit and what are the results of the Summit.”122 While Babst specifically talks about 
NATO’s Istanbul Summit, the public diplomacy campaign used is representative of the lengths 
the Alliance will go in order to create and maintain a positive image with a target audience. The 
use of transparency through “reaching out” and “explaining” shows NATO’s commitment to 
positive communication with target audiences.  
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  Babst also focused on public diplomacy and NATO’s importance at the Istanbul Summit. 
She asserted that for a political event such as a Summit, reaching out to young people was 
important as well as “[demonstrating] that NATO’s important, NATO matters, and their 
encouragement, and their involvement in NATO matters is welcome, is wanted.”123 By involving 
a specific target audience such as young people, NATO may emphasize a positive image on them 
and portray itself as a relevant and important organization in international politics. While this 
example involves young people at the Istanbul Summit, the Public Diplomacy Division’s 
strategy may be used in other situations and toward other target audiences, such as the Russian 
Federation and its people in order to foster a positive relationship. 
Long-term relationship with Russian public  
 In October 2004, NATO Information Office (NIO) Director Isabelle Francois also 
discussed elements of NATO’s public diplomacy strategy. She observed that the Office had 
already established a good reputation in Russia, but that NATO’s image in and relationship with 
Russia is a long-term investment. Francois stated that  
as [the NIO] relates to changing NATO’s image in Russia, I guess this is a long-term 
investment, and I’m sure that responding to the skeptics will continue to be a challenge, 
and I suspect things will not change overnight. The same thing applies to skeptics on the 
NATO side about this relationship.124  
 
She related the NATO Information Office’s work in Russia to an arduous marathon. Francois’ 
description of the NIO and NATO’s relationship with Russia portrays NATO’s public diplomacy 
strategy as developing a positive image and relationship over a long period of time. The Alliance 
is dedicated to a partnership with Russia and is committed to explaining NATO to the Russian 
people. Such a relationship and commitment demonstrates the organization’s transparency. 
 Francois continued her discussion of public diplomacy strategies in the NIO. She 
observed that  
52 
 in terms of public diplomacy, I think it is very important that we tackle together some 
sort of information strategy whereby we develop these messages together and whereby 
we address some of the less positive rhetoric, public rhetoric that we often see in the 
press, and I think that we can look for opportunities as we prepare for the foreign 
ministerial in December.125 
 
Here, she discussed the NATO Information Office’s involvement with its Russian colleagues to 
address positive and negative images of NATO among the Russian people. By working with the 
Russians, NATO demonstrates an open relationship with its Strategic Partners. Also, the NIO’s 
recognition and explanation of negative and “less positive” rhetoric regarding NATO may 
improve the organization’s image and relationship with Russia by opening dialogue and 
enhancing transparency. 
 Francois concluded her October 2004 interview by discussing areas for NATO-Russia 
improvement. She stated that  
beyond the phase of setting up the NRC, I think it is now time for us to look into more 
operational co-operation…that, ultimately, through this practical co-operation and this 
open dialogue, we will be able to develop, over time, shared values. This will be the 
bedrock of this solid relationship.126 
 
Not only do both parties need open dialogue, but they also need to physically work together in a 
constructive manner on operational endeavors. Francois named this area as the only one in need 
of improvement. According to her, dialogue is not enough without operational cooperation. By 
encompassing open dialogue, dissemination and explanation of NATO images, and working 
together in operational cooperation, NATO and Russia may work toward a better partnership and 
NATO may have an improved image in the nation.  
Relationships with other publics 
 NATO may improve its public diplomacy strategies through its relationships with other 
publics, such as with Georgia. In November 2005, Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer met 
with Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli to discuss their new relationship. Scheffer 
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 observed that “needless to say that NATO will support Georgia wherever it needs assistance in 
implementing those difficult reforms. And we realize there is still a long way to go. But NATO 
is there, ready to assist.”127 Here, Scheffer refers to Georgia’s participation in International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) security reforms. NATO’s 
support and availability to help Georgia shows that the organization is committed to all of its 
relationships, which may demonstrate to Russia a positive NATO image.  
 Prime Minister Noghaideli also commented on NATO’s support and welcoming 
relationship. He observed that “the door for NATO is open for us [Georgia]. And that’s a most 
important thing. And it was also being mentioned that no other country should be allowed to veto 
Georgia’s NATO aspirations. And that’s another very important thing for us.”128 Noghaideli 
emphasized the importance of NATO’s open relationship and “open door” with Georgia. He also 
commented that no other country should be allowed to veto Georgia’s aspirations to NATO 
enlargement. Such comments portray NATO as a powerful and important organization of which 
to be a part. The public diplomacy strategy used here demonstrates the Alliance’s relevance and 
importance in international politics. Developing a positive relationship with NATO may be seen 
as a secure way to enter into European and transatlantic politics as well as maintain stability. 
 By developing relationships with non-member nations, NATO avoids the need to sell the 
organization as a brand; the Alliance’s relationships create and foster a positive image for the 
organization. In a press conference following the December 2005 meeting of the NATO-Ukraine 
Commission, Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer asserted that “my job is not to sell 
NATO. NATO doesn’t need to be sold. Our job is to explain NATO.”129 The Alliance’s 
relationship with the Ukraine in the NATO-Ukraine Commission allows NATO to explain its 
purpose in current international politics as well as portray a supportive and proactive image to 
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 the Ukrainian people. The Alliance participates in similar endeavors in the NATO Information 
Office in Moscow, in order to explain its role and image to Russian publics. 
Positive NATO Image 
NATO’s abilities 
 Through NATO’s relationships with other countries and non-member states, the 
organization may be able to project a positive image of itself to its target audiences, specifically 
Russia. One focus of the positive NATO image is NATO’s abilities. In October 2004, Secretary 
General Scheffer spoke at the Clingendael Institute to delineate NATO’s role as a global 
organization. After recalling NATO’s involvement in a series of international events which 
surpassed its transatlantic boundaries, he observed  
Why am I recalling these steps? Three reasons. First they show that NATO’s out-of-area 
evolution happened out of necessity. Second, in taking on these new missions, NATO 
demonstrated an ability to adapt to entirely new challenges. Third, and perhaps most 
importantly, the Alliance also demonstrated the stamina to engage for the long term, and 
– as in the case of Kosovo – to take the heat for controversial decisions.130 
 
Scheffer’s speech related NATO as a powerful and adaptable organization with long term 
staying power. NATO’s established place as an international political organization has given it 
experience to adapt to new situations and challenges. Scheffer even claims that the Alliance is 
able to “take the heat” for controversial situations among other international players. By 
delineating NATO’s abilities in the international political arena, Scheffer paints the organization 
in a positive and powerful light. 
 While highlighting NATO’s abilities, Scheffer also stated that NATO’s involvement in 
international affairs should be as part of a comprehensive response, not as a world policeman. He 
asserted in his speech at the Clingendael Institute that “it is evident to me that NATO must be 
part of that [comprehensive] response – not as a ‘gendarme du monde,’ however, but as one 
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 important element of a much broader international approach.”131 While NATO has the ability to 
maintain transatlantic security, support fledgling nations, etc, Scheffer affirmed that this ability is 
only part of a comprehensive response from other nations and international organizations. NATO 
is not, as Scheffer stated, a “gendarme du monde” or world policeman. The Alliance’s abilities 
are only part of a collective effort along with other nations and organizations. 
 In specific regard to the NATO-Russia relationship, Secretary General Jaap de Hoop 
Scheffer has been able to give examples of NATO’s abilities. At a news conference following 
the September 2005 working luncheon of the NATO-Russia Council, Scheffer observed that  
you remember when the Russian sailors were trapped in their submersible, NATO 
countries came to help…and many other exercises we’re having in many different fields, 
had found a very practical example here when the United Kingdom and others, came to 
the assistance of the Russians. So we have that to build on.132 
 
Here, Scheffer referred to the August 2005 rescue of seven Russian sailors and their submarine 
by the United Kingdom Royal Navy. Weeks before the rescue, NATO conducted an extensive 
two-week submarine rescue exercise; after the Russian rescue, NATO developed several other 
submarine rescue initiatives and a NATO Submarine Rescue System. NATO exercises and 
capabilities may help strengthen the NATO-Russia relationship as well as improve the Alliance’s 
image by saving lives. 
NATO as a reward or incentive 
 NATO also emphasizes itself as a reward or incentive to those countries who seek 
membership and/or partnership with the Alliance. Officials such as Secretary General Scheffer 
project the image of NATO as a core institution, of which any nation would want to be a 
member. He stated at the April 2004 Ceremonial Session of the North Atlantic Council that 
The [seven] new [NATO] members can rightly claim that membership in NATO is a 
reward for all their hard work in preparing for accession. That should be a powerful 
incentive to those other nations who share the same values, and the same ambitions, and 
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 are working with us towards their membership. My message to those nations is: staying 
on the path of reform will ultimately pay off. For NATO’s doors will remain open.133 
 
As Scheffer referred to the accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia into NATO, he also stressed that the Alliance will be open to relationships with 
only those nations that choose to reform their governments in a democratic way. Non-member 
nations such as Russia must change their values and ambitions in order to have a positive and 
proactive relationship with NATO. While Scheffer’s speech regarding NATO membership and 
partnership is conditional, the overall message emphasized a greater good for the security and 
stability of the transatlantic region. 
 Secretary General Scheffer associated the image of NATO with that of a reward or 
incentive almost a year later during a press conference following the working lunch of the North 
Atlantic Council in February 2005. He observed that “NATO has an open door policy, that all 
European democracies who fulfill the conditions for NATO membership can go the long and 
sometimes complicated road to NATO membership.”134 Scheffer inferred that those nations who 
work toward NATO’s ideals will be rewarded with membership. Not only will these nations be 
included in enlargement, but they may also receive assistance from the Alliance while fulfilling 
NATO conditions. Secretary General Scheffer asserted in his speech that “NATO can assist…in 
giving body to the action plan and giving body to the annual target plans, and that is the way 
we’ll operate.”135 While Russia may never fit in this group of NATO-hopefuls, the nation may 
still work toward a strategic and working partnership with the organization.  
 Accession into NATO was not only seen as a reward by NATO, but also as helpful to the 
Alliance’s work toward transatlantic stability. Secretary General Scheffer marked the one year 
anniversary of the seven new member states by observing that “the accession of seven countries 
to NATO one year ago has benefited not only the Alliance, but also security in the entire Euro-
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 Atlantic region.”136 The reward is not only a one-way street; the individual member nations 
benefit from the Alliance and the continent as a whole improves its security and stability. 
Scheffer added that all seven new members played their full part in “promoting values that make 
NATO a true symbol of cooperation, democracy, and peaceful relations.”137 This comment 
makes NATO’s views toward enlargement seem more than self-serving. NATO is not only a 
reward, but the nations involved are a reward for the security of the continent. The two-way 
beneficial relationship in NATO accession portrays the organization in a positive light, focusing 
on the improvement of transatlantic security. 
Integral partner for Russia 
 Another positive image that NATO tries to portray is one of integral partner for Russia. 
As an integral partner, NATO shows Russia full support in hardships and trouble, as in the 2005 
submarine rescue. The Alliance also demonstrated support and partnership after the Beslan 
school hostage crisis on September 1, 2004. Secretary General Scheffer not only expressed his 
sympathy and condolences to the Russian people, but he also called on the international 
community to stand against and put an end to terrorism. He stated that “these attacks reinforce 
the requirement for the international community to stand together in the fight against terrorism. 
NATO and the NATO-Russia Council will continue to contribute to this vital international 
campaign.”138 Scheffer and NATO demonstrated their support for their strategic partner and also 
emphasized the importance of the NATO-Russia Council in the international fight against 
terrorism. 
 NATO showed its continued support to the Russian Federation on September 7, 2004. 
Ambassador Karel Kovanda, Dean of the North Atlantic Council, discussed at a meeting of the 
NATO-Russia Council NATO’s determination to work with Russia in the struggle against 
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 terrorism. He stated that “we extend a helping hand as best we know how, and the Russian 
Ambassador has graciously acknowledged this assistance. Above all, though, today we grieve 
with you and your people, Konstantin Vasilyevich, today we mourn your victims with you.”139 
Kovanda’s support to Russia through his words to Russian Ambassador General Konstantin 
Vasilyevich Totskiy depicted NATO as an ally through such a difficult time. While NATO and 
Russia may not agree on decisions and topics all the time, the presence of the Alliance in times 
of need painted NATO in a positive light. NATO’s supportive nature makes NATO an integral 
partner. 
 NATO does not only show support to its partners when they are in need. In the third year 
of the NATO-Russia Council and the development of their relationship, NATO defends Russia 
to those who would question the partnership. In a speech to the Ukrainian Diplomatic Academy 
in October 2005, Secretary General Scheffer asserted that 
[The Ukrainian people] need to understand that integration into the Alliance and strategic 
partnership with Russia are not competing, mutually exclusive goals. Indeed, NATO 
itself launched a very dynamic partnership with Russia and that partnership continues to 
deepen and row.140 
 
He demonstrated that NATO’s relationship with Russia is positive and growing in a proactive 
way. While former Soviet Bloc nations may fear Russia, NATO reassures them that the NATO-
Russia partnership does not affect the Alliance in a negative way; Russia’s existence as a NATO 
strategic partner will not compete with NATO’s support of other former Soviet nations. Here, 
NATO supports and defends Russia while reassuring new member states as well as other 
strategic partners. 
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 Negative NATO Image 
Enlargement 
 While NATO has tried to focus on the positive aspects of its enlargement and assure its 
audiences that the accession of former Soviet Bloc nations will add to the security and stability 
of the European continent, Russia still did not view the enlargement favorably. In April 2004, 
Director of the Brussels office of the Center for Defense Information Tomas Valasek wrote an 
article for the NATO website discussing the effects of NATO’s enlargement. He stated that 
Moscow responded to the enlargement with a mixture of skepticism and hostility; the different 
views of Russia that the new members would bring to NATO could harm the NATO-Russia 
relationship. Yet, Valasek observed that new views on Russia could help NATO “benefit from 
acquiring a more finely tuned ‘Russia’ radar, informed by the knowledge and experience of some 
of those countries that know Moscow best.”141 While NATO may use these new Russian views 
to improve its relationship, Russia may feel threatened and the NATO-Russia relationship could 
suffer. Valasek stated that  
the challenge for NATO will be to avoid giving in to irrational fears while tapping into 
the energy and the focus of the new members’ policies toward Moscow. Getting the 
balance right will be important, all the more so because of the attention that Russia has 
given to enlargement.142 
 
The mixed feelings toward Russia that NATO must deal with could create a negative image for 
the organization in the eyes of the Russians. While the Alliance needs to foster a positive 
relationship with Russia, listening to negative views of Russia from its new NATO member 
states could hinder future dealing with the nation. 
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 NATO vs. Russia 
Russia’s shortcomings 
 Although the Alliance has been supportive of Russia and has tried to maintain a proactive 
relationship with the nation, negative images of Russia and its shortcomings have been present in 
NATO publications. In October 2004, Director of the Center for Political and International 
Studies and of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Security in Moscow Alexander Nikitin wrote an 
article for the NATO website, assessing the Russian experience of participating in NATO-led 
peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. Describing the size of the troops involved in the 
operations, Nikitin observed that “the Russian troops were not decisive to the success of these 
missions” and that “Russian participation in [peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations] 
[was] not exceptional.”143 He emphasized Russia’s shortcomings and suspicions in any NATO-
led operations. His description continued, observing that 
many Russians remained suspicious of the Alliance’s ultimate intentions, viewing the 
entire exercise in terms of its impact on Russia. These attitudes, very much the legacy of 
Cold War zero-sum thinking, reflected poor understanding among most Russians of 
NATO’s transformation and an enduring image of the Alliance as a Western military 
machine designed to wage war.144 
 
While Nikitin is not a NATO official, his involvement with the Alliance and the publication of 
his views on the NATO website show his stature within the organization and possibly reflect its 
sentiments toward Russian participation in NATO operations. Even as a fellow Russian, Nikitin 
does not paint a positive picture of his countrymen. His article does critique NATO actions and 
behaviors as well, but portraying the Russians in this way gives them a negative image. The 
publication of this article on the NATO website also demonstrates a sort of antipathy from 
NATO toward their Russian strategic partners. 
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 In response to Russian actions  
 Negative comments from NATO officials regarding Russia are only apparent in 
disagreements on security measures and when Russia is forcibly present in former Soviet 
territories. In May 2005, Secretary Genereal Jaap de Hoop Scheffer commented on an agreement 
between Russia and Georgia regarding the former’s military presence in the latter. While the two 
sides developed their cooperative relations, conditions, and duration of the Russian military in 
Georgia, Scheffer stated that “it is my hope that outstanding issues related to the withdrawal of 
remaining Russian military personnel and equipment…can be resolved as soon as possible.”145 
Scheffer’s statement seemed to be criticizing Russia’s involvement in the area, giving a NATO 
versus Russia feeling. During this era of the NATO-Russia relationship, the Alliance became 
more critical of its strategic partner and this critical language became more apparent in NATO 
speeches and publications. 
NATO-Russia Partnership 
Russian participation 
 Despite various sentiments about Russia, the nation’s participation in the NATO-Russia 
Council and NATO activities was apparent to NATO officials. In an April 2004 interview with 
Secretary General Scheffer following an informal meeting of the NATO-Russia Council, he 
found that the atmosphere of the meeting was good. He stated that “the fact that Minister Lavrov 
has come to Brussels is, of course, a good sign that he and the Russians take the NRC 
seriously.”146 Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s participation in NRC events 
demonstrated that the Russians wanted to continue their constructive relationship with NATO. 
Scheffer even commented that “I think Minister Lavrov and I very much agreed in our 
bilateral…in our brief bilateral conversation that this partnership is strong and can even be 
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 strengthened.”147 Thus, bilateral participation and conversation may denote a continued 
partnership. 
 Secretary General Scheffer observed in June 2004 that “in the first half of this year, we 
have made substantial progress in achieving a qualitatively new NATO-Russia partnership, 
founded on two essential pillars of frank, open political dialogue and pragmatic, result-oriented 
practical co-operation.”148 Russia’s partnership and participation in NATO operations has 
opened the relationship to better communication and cooperation. In October 2004 after the 
Beslan tragedy, Scheffer found the NATO-Russian partnership open to discussion “to turn our 
words into actions and to make NATO-Russia increasingly operational through result-oriented 
practical cooperation.”149 Over the course of a few months, the NATO-Russia partnership was 
open to more operations, dialogue, and practical cooperation. Among the partnership’s open 
dialogue was healthy debate concerning NATO-led operations and endeavors. Scheffer stated in 
December 2004 that “the NRC is of course important for practical cooperation, but is also 
important to have broad political debate.”150 By debating issues relevant to the transatlantic 
region and the NATO-Russia partnership, better understanding and a stronger relationship may 
be formed. 
Terrorism 
 While NATO and Russia have many areas of interest in which they work together, 
terrorism has begun to play a major part. Since the Beslan school hostage crisis in August 2004, 
Russia’s participation in anti-terrorism efforts has increased and NATO has supported their 
interest. Secretary General Scheffer stated in June 2005 that “nowhere is the need for such 
cooperation more urgent than in the struggle against terrorism. Our discussion today will permit 
us to take stock of our common efforts in this area and reaffirm our solidarity in this struggle.”151 
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 By emphasizing the issue of terrorism and the efforts needed to fight against it, NATO reaffirms 
their partnership with Russia. 
Working together 
 By engaging in operations together and opening dialogue between the two parties, NATO 
and Russia develop a relationship in which they are working together toward a more stable and 
secure continent. In June 2005, Secretary General recalled Russian President Putin’s words to the 
Russian Security Council. He summed up the NATO-Russia relationship by pointing out that  
‘in just a very short time, we have taken a gigantic step’ away from past confrontation 
and stereotypes. And [Putin] judged that NATO-Russia relations had ‘become a real 
factor in ensuring international stability,’ underlining that this cooperation had made it 
possible for us to ‘deal a serious blow to international terrorism.’152 
 
By repeating President Putin’s words regarding the NATO-Russia relationship, Scheffer 
demonstrated the importance of Russia in the partnership and showed solidarity. Scheffer added 
that “if we are to build a true partnership, it must be based on trust. Trust between genuine 
partners, working to develop common solutions to shared challenges. Trust in a shared vision of 
a common future.”153 Through cooperation and trust, NATO and Russia can effectively work 
together to combat threats to international security, such as terrorism. 
 Even Russian officials working with NATO in the NATO-Russia Council have described 
the progress of the partnership. Sergei Ivanov, Minister of Defense for Russia, stated in October 
2005 that “time alone will not solve everything. In addition to time, it will take good will, 
resolve, and a willingness to meet each other half way, gradually setting aside the misgivings and 
distrust that remain as a legacy of the Cold War.”154 Here, Ivanov admitted that both parties must 
work together and “meet each other half way” in order to progress and leave behind the 
sentiments of the Cold War. He added that  
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 the potential in our cooperation and that of the NATO-Russia Council is far from 
exhausted. I believe, therefore, that in time it will be possible to elevate our relationship 
to an even higher level, which might rightly be termed a ‘mature partnership.’155 
 
Ivanov believed that the through the cooperation and equality of the NATO-Russia Council, the 
partnership between the two parties could mature and grow. By working together, long term 
stability may be achieved. 
NATO’s Current Image toward Russia (2006-2008) 
NATO-Russia Partnership 
Importance of maintaining security 
 Throughout the ever-changing course of the NATO-Russia relationship, the objectives of 
the partnership and the focus on its importance have not changed. Secretary General Jaap de 
Hoop Scheffer observed in June 2007 that  
NATO-Russia cooperation is not just about overcoming the legacy of the past; it is first 
and foremost about building a more secure future: one that is in NATO’s interest, but also 
in Russia’s interest. Russia is an obvious – and I would even say natural – partner for us. 
156  
 
De Hoop Scheffer refers to security and the importance of the NATO-Russia alliance in 
maintaining that security. A secure Europe and a secure world are in the interest of not only 
NATO member states, but also Russia, who is a major player in the global arena. De Hoop 
Scheffer added that “NATO-Russia relations are a real two-way street, where both Russia and 
NATO benefit.” 157 In this comment, both NATO and Russia benefit from their partnership, but 
both must equally contribute and participate in the partnership for its success. 
 As Russia and NATO benefit from their partnership, the two parties must also work 
together to create and maintain their security. Since the creation of the NATO-Russia Council in 
2002, the partners have worked together on various security and peacekeeping missions. Jaap de 
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 Hoop Scheffer noted the NRC’s efforts against terrorism, which has plagued NATO member 
states as well as Russia. The Russian Federation has worked with the Alliance on anti-terrorist 
operations such as Operation Active Endeavor, which maintains security in the Mediterranean 
Sea, as well as anti-narcotics ventures in Afghanistan. He stated in October 2006 that “NATO 
and Russia have a cooperative project in the fight against terrorism and this is certainly also an 
area where we should and we can further invest in the relationship between Russia and NATO.” 
158 By combating a mutual threat, the partnership between NATO and Russia can grow and 
strengthen its bond. The security benefits created by the NATO-Russia Council stem from the 
Alliance reaching out to Russia and other former Eastern Bloc countries. De Hoop Scheffer 
affirmed that “we have seen a region of security and stability increase when NATO enlargement 
took place, and not decrease, but increase.” 159 Although Russia is not a member of the NATO 
alliance, partnership with the former Eastern Bloc countries which are now part of NATO 
enlargement gives all members in the relationship equal standing; NATO enlargement and 
partnership with Russia have both increased security and stability in the transatlantic region. By 
participating in security operations with Russia and former Eastern Bloc countries, NATO 
strengthens its image as a partner and ally. 
 A strengthened relationship and partnership with Russia and the former Eastern Bloc may 
help maintain security and development on the European continent and other areas of the world 
that are helped by NATO. In developing and war-torn countries such as Afghanistan, NATO’s 
presence not only assures humanitarian assistance, but also provides increased security. De Hoop 
Scheffer stated in December 2006 that  
security and development must go hand in hand. Reconstruction and development have 
almost had to start from scratch; a whole new political process has to be created; fighting 
and nation building have to be carried out in parallel; and regional neighbors must be 
engaged. NATO has to do what NATO does best and that is providing security. We can 
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 help with the reconstruction and development, but the main part has to be done by others. 
160 
 
Here, he acknowledged NATO’s proficiency at providing security and helping countries in need. 
Through a strengthened partnership with Russia in the NATO-Russia Council, these goals may 
be more quickly and/or more easily achieved. 
Improvement of communication efforts 
De Hoop Scheffer remained positive about NATO’s commitments and communication 
skills. He observed in December 2006 that partnership with NATO’s many member countries 
and special relationships with non-NATO members requires “specific mechanisms for 
coordination and cooperation…it also requires mechanisms to foster transparency and build 
confidence.” 161 Transparency and confidence-building entail open communication between 
NATO and nations such as Russia. De Hoop Scheffer’s optimism and positive take on NATO’s 
communication mechanisms for coordination and cooperation shows commitment to improving 
its relationships with nations such as Russia.  
 While Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer spoke positively and optimistically about 
the NATO-Russia relationship, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy 
Stefanie Babst had a different take on the partnership. On 22 June 2007, she stated that she and 
NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) have “put a lot of focus on improving our 
communication efforts vis-à-vis Russia and in Russia so that [it is very much an asserted 
priority].” 162 Her stance on the NATO-Russia relationship focuses on the organization’s 
shortcomings. Babst believed that NATO needed to improve its communication efforts, 
suggesting that the Alliance had not taken all measures to foster a positive relationship and 
image in Russia. Her final remark in the video interview ends, “we try our very best in order to 
make NATO more visible and get our story out in a better way. I guess there is not much time 
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 left for vacation.” 163 With “no time left for vacation,” Babst implied that the Public Diplomacy 
Division and NATO in general have a lot of work to do in their relationship with Russia, more 
specifically in their public diplomacy tactics and branding strategies; NATO must improve its 
communication and visibility. While NATO’s official face, Secretary General Jaap de Hoop 
Scheffer, painted NATO in a positive light, the officials who work more closely with the 
Alliance’s public diplomacy and branding strategy, Stefanie Babst, revealed a more real and 
flawed NATO that needs improvement in its NATO-Russia relationship. 
NATO vs. Russia 
NATO becomes more critical of Russia 
 In recent years, NATO’s relationship with Russia has become more critical. Russia’s 
recent conflict with Georgia has received admonishment from the NATO allies. The NATO 
Review observed that the Allies  
called upon Russia to respect international values and principles on which [the] 
international security system is based, to implement fully the commitments agreed with 
Georgia and to refrain from confrontational statements and threats to the security of 
Allies and partners. 164  
 
The Review implicated Russia as a dissenting nation, not acting in accordance with NATO’s 
international relations practices or international security principles. NATO’s firm response to 
Russia’s military actions in Georgia, South Ossetia, and the Abkhazia region demonstrated a 
shift from the friendly and supportive NATO image from 2002.  
 NATO’s critical stance toward Russia began in 2006, due to the escalated tensions 
between Russia and Georgia. NATO Spokesman James Appathurai stated in November 2006 
that the Secretary General “does wish to see both parties de-escalate tensions. He has specifically 
said that he hopes that Russia can take steps to lift the punitive measures that it has taken against 
Georgia as quickly as possible.” 165 Appathurai and Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 
68 
 who are both official representatives of NATO, specifically called out Russia in their statement 
about the conflict. NATO reprimanded Russia for the measures it took against Georgia. By 
singling out Russia as the antagonist and instigator, the Alliance publicly reprimanded the nation. 
NATO’s stance against Russia concerning the conflict with Georgia portrayed the organization 
in a criticizing and authoritarian manner.  
NATO’s image as authority figure 
While Appathurai voiced the organization’s concern for and critique of Russia’s conflict 
with Georgia, he also stated that NATO does not want a direct role in the situation. Appathurai 
observed that “the Secretary General has made it clear that NATO does not intend to play a 
direct role in mediating between the two parties. That’s quite clear.” 166 While NATO wanted to 
see Russia lift the punitive measures it took against Georgia, the organization’s removed position 
from the conflict reflected one of authority and moral standard. NATO does not want to be 
immediately involved in international conflicts, but wants to set an authoritative and standard 
image that might influence the actions of non-member nations. The organization’s authoritative 
tone may be seen in more specific directions stated by Appathurai: 
NATO’s clear sentiment is that both parties should take every step, A) to 
moderate the language that they use in regards to the current tensions, and B) to take 
active steps to de-escalate what is a very tense situation and that those steps should be 
taken as quickly as possible. 167 
  
The Alliance’s formal directions imply that NATO is a major player in international 
relations and politics, and that Russia and Georgia should heed its command. NATO’s 
authoritative image also shows that the organization is opposing Russia’s decisions and actions; 
Russia is in some ways an opponent of NATO.  
NATO’s image of authority figure toward Russia continued to appear in the statements of 
its officials. Current NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated in an August 2008 
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 press conference that “the use of force by the Russian side is not in conformity, or is [in] 
violation [of] the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] mandate and it should stop as soon 
as possible.” 168 The CIS mandate instructed Russian, Georgian, and other CIS member troops to 
work together as part of the Commonwealth’s peacekeeping initiative. De Hoop Scheffer made 
his point clear that Russia violated international directives and that the nation should adhere to 
the mandates of the Alliance. By rebuking Russia’s actions, de Hoop Scheffer and NATO 
changed the organization’s image to an authoritarian nature.  
 While NATO’s image and dialogue toward Russia became more critical and 
authoritarian, the Alliance acknowledged that this image might not produce the desired outcome 
from Russia. At Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer’s August 2008 press conference, he 
commented that “giving the remarks the allies have made and I have made about the use of 
excessive and disproportionate force, I cannot [imagine] that the Allies and Russia will quickly 
see eye-to-eye on this one.” 169 Any powerful country such as Russia would not enjoy censure 
and/or authoritative commands from organizations like NATO. Yet, NATO’s new image did let 
Russia and the world know that such actions are not condoned by the Alliance and will likely 
affect Russia’s international relationships. 
Demands from NATO 
 De Hoop Scheffer continued at the 12 August 2008 press conference by saying that a 
Russian cease fire would be good news, “it would be good news because it would mean that 
there would be [a] result [from] me and other people urging the Russian side…for a cease fire.” 
170 He referred to an alleged remark by current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to the media 
earlier that day that Russian military action had halted. Rumors of a Russian cease fire showed 
that NATO resistance possibly influenced Russia’s decision-making; NATO’s change to a more 
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 aggressive image may be a factor in the actions of non-NATO member countries. Yet, while de 
Hoop Scheffer remarked that a Russian military cease fire would be good news to the Alliance, 
he also said that “it’s an important step, but it’s not enough…” 171 De Hoop Scheffer stated that 
the status quo from 6 August must be restored, returning all forces to the positions that they had 
on that date. While NATO welcomed news of a cease fire, the most desired outcome was the 
removal of all Russian forces from Georgia, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. The Alliance 
remained firm in its demands from Russia. 
NATO’s Public Diplomacy 
Explaining NATO to the Russian public 
 NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) is the main office through which the 
organization creates its image and communicates with other nations and publics. A summary on 
NATO’s PDD states that “the Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) plays a key role in explaining 
NATO’s policies and activities to the public and, as such, is NATO’s main public interface with 
audiences world-wide.” 172 The PDD also has a NATO Information Office (NIO) in Moscow 
that deals directly with Russian publics to more successfully convey the image set by the PDD. 
The current Assistant Secretary General for the PDD Jean-Francois Bureau asserted in a March 
2008 interview, 
I think that we have three main challenges. The first one is to take into account the new 
missions NATO has to fulfill. The organization has changed a lot during the last 16 years, 
since the end of the Cold War.173 
 
Bureau acknowledged that NATO has changed since the fall of the Soviet Union and that the 
organization still has much to do. His admission to a changing and imperfect NATO 
demonstrates a strong link to image. He added that “…we strongly believe that the image is a 
huge way to communicate with the largest publics.” 174 As NATO’s PDD implements new and 
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 different public diplomacy tactics, such as its admonishment of Russian military actions, the 
department creates a new image that communicates the Alliance’s position toward the dissenting 
nation. 
 NATO’s commitment to its Public Diplomacy Division and communicating with Russia 
is also seen in the workshops and seminars it has implemented in recent years. A public 
diplomacy workshop in July 2007 confirmed that  
while new media was having a tremendous impact changing communication into a two-
way dialogue with audiences, participants stressed that the content of public diplomacy 
was more important than the medium used for its delivery…public diplomacy should be 
an integral part of policy definition as well as policy implementation. 175  
 
The NATO workshop displayed the organization’s commitment to improving its public 
diplomacy and communication skills with foreign publics, especially with integral partners such 
as Russia. By reaching out to Russian and other former Communist Bloc publics, NATO’s image 
as partner and ally may be more readily accepted.  
 NATO Spokesman James Appathurai emphasized the importance of NATO’s public 
diplomacy at a 2006 press briefing. He also linked the organization’s public diplomacy and 
communication efforts to the success of maintaining security in the transatlantic region. 
Appathurai stated that  
NATO has, since the end of the Cold War…a much greater public diplomacy challenge 
than we ever had before because we are dealing with security issues that can seem 
abstract or geographically [distant]. And it is our job to do more, to explain better, why 
NATO is still and it is still keeping people safe. 176 
 
NATO’s task is to better communicate its new identity to foreign publics such as Russia. By 
better conveying its image as a source of security and stability as well as a partner for Russia, 
such a relationship may be more favorable to the nation and its people.  
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 Credibility 
 Thus, NATO’s branding strategy relates back to its relationships and its influence in 
international politics. As Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated in reference to Russia’s military actions in 
August 2008, “we should realize NATO has no military mandate in the region, so if you say 
NATO can’t solve this question militarily, you’re right, we can’t. And that is not NATO’s 
ambition and it’s not NATO’s mandate.” 177 Due to the Alliance’s lack of military might and 
hard power force, the organization must utilize its soft power skills – its branding strategy. 
Scheffer realized that NATO could never persuade Russia to leave Georgia through military 
force, but his statement infers that NATO’s power and influence lie in its public diplomacy and 
branding strategy. The Minister of Defense of Denmark and NATO representative Mr. Soren 
Gade spoke to fellow NATO officials and members in October 2007 about the importance of 
public diplomacy in NATO-led operations. Gade affirmed that “for us there can be no 
compromise in terms of our credibility. We must be credible!...That goes for managing 
expectations of home audiences, the local populations and our international partners in the 
mission areas.” 178 His declaration that credibility applies to the management of international 
partnerships can be linked to NATO’s current relationship with Russia and how the organization 
is portraying itself. The credibility in NATO’s authoritarian image lies in its actions toward the 
country as well as in the dialogue of its officials and presentations to the media. Yet, while 
presenting firm opposition to Russia’s dissenting military actions toward Georgia, NATO also 
created another image as a responsible and professional organization through its public 
diplomacy seminars, workshops, and speeches. Gade’s call for credibility holds the organization, 
including its member nations and staff, accountable for its dialogue and actions in the creation 
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 and maintenance of its image. NATO’s international relationships, internal workings, public 
actions, and core objectives, and branding strategy are all linked together through credibility. 
Positive NATO Image 
Stability of NATO 
 In addition to NATO’s branding Russia in a negative way, the Alliance portrays itself in a 
positive light. Current Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy Jean Francois Bureau 
remarked at a January 2008 NATO seminar,  
Our [NATO] political dialogue derives from the role of a transformed and still 
transforming NATO, which since the end of the Cold War is projecting stability through 
its operations and missions, its broad range of partnerships and through its transforming 
military capabilities, with the overall objective to maintain stability and peace. 179 
  
Bureau inferred that the organization projects stability in all of its actions, operating as the voice 
of reason in international relations. He described NATO’s actions in a most favorable light, 
engaging in a broad range of partnerships and conducting transforming military capabilities. 
Bureau suggested that NATO’s operations and missions have created thorough knowledge and 
capabilities in political dialogue, stating, “NATO is an Organization that has been engaged in 
multi-national security cooperation for more than half a century, with lots of experience and 
expertise to share with non-NATO countries to work together for stability and peace.” 180 NATO 
can do no wrong and is always successful in maintaining stability and peace in all of its 
partnerships. By disregarding any negative and unsuccessful relationships in NATO history, 
including NATO’s stance against the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Bureau creates a purely 
positive image for the Alliance. 
 NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer also emphasized the organization’s 
efforts in the area of stability. At a 2006 conference in London, he stated that  
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 we need better international cooperation between nations, and more effective engagement 
by the international institutions. NATO has learned this lesson, and is already playing its 
part. To continue defending our values in this globalized world, NATO has developed a 
new approach to security. I call this approach ‘projecting stability’ and it is most visibly 
demonstrated by NATO’s current operations. 181 
 
De Hoop Scheffer suggested that NATO’s experience of “learning its lesson” in international 
cooperation and engagement has improved its approach to security and stability. NATO’s active 
interest in and development of its image as a secure and stable Alliance positively portrays the 
organization; NATO seems to have learned from its past experiences in international cooperation 
and has developed new tactics to defend its core values and beliefs. De Hoop Scheffer listed the 
Alliance’s essential values as freedom of speech, freedom to travel, freedom to elect your own 
government, and freedom of religion. He stressed that “these values cannot be taken for granted 
– they still need to be worked for; they still need to be nourished and, when necessary, they still 
need to be protected. And this continues to be NATO’s role.” 182 By projecting NATO’s aim for 
security and stability as well as reaffirming the values it strives to defend, de Hoop Scheffer 
painted the organization and its aspirations in a most favorable light. 
NATO’s belief in equality 
 While avoiding any negative image garnered during the Cold War and in other 
relationships, NATO further enhanced its image by linking equality to its stability characteristic. 
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated at the NATO-Russia Council Seminar on 25 June 2007, “…NATO 
also believes that every country, including Russia, stands to benefit from a Europe that is whole, 
free and at peace – with more democracy, more stability, more security, more rule of law and 
more democratic control of the armed forces.” 183 De Hoop Scheffer talked about a Europe that 
is free, peaceful, and governed by democracy. This new unified Europe garners equality in it
actions, and NATO’s association through de Hoop Scheffer’s speech gives the organization the 
s 
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 characteristic as well. By describing a stable and democratic Europe that is part of the Alliance, 
NATO associates itself positively with prosperity and peace. The emphasis of democracy in de 
Hoop Scheffer’s speech alludes to the contrasting Communism of the former Soviet Union. 
While Russia is now a democratic nation, its Communist past and current unstable tendencies do 
not provide a positive portrayal. 
 NATO’s actions in the NATO-Russia Council also show their commitment to the 
equality of its members. At the June 2008 meeting of the NRC Ministers of Defense, the 
ministers “reaffirmed their commitment to the further development of practical cooperation 
and…welcomed Russia’s planned contribution…to Operation Active Endeavor…” 184 The 
NATO-Russia Council’s commitment to practical cooperation between the two parties 
demonstrates NATO’s belief in equality for not only NATO member states, but also NATO’s 
strategic partners. At the meeting, the Ministers of Defense saw Russia’s interest and 
participation in Operation Active Endeavor as “enhanced operational cooperation and a signal of 
the NRC’s continuing commitment to the fight against terrorism.” 185 Such participation and 
constructive work and deliberation show the NATO-Russia Council to be a forum for equality, 
or at least a forum that strives for the equality of its members. 
NATO honors its commitments to Russia 
 Yet, NATO wants to reassure Russia and all members of the transatlantic community that 
the organization believes in equality in all of its partnerships. While the 2007 NATO-Russia 
Council Seminar, which focuses on the role of the NRC, discussed NATO-Russia cooperation 
and the interoperability of their forces, de Hoop Scheffer’s speech depicts the organization as a 
welcoming, cooperating, and equal partner in its relations with the former Soviet Union. De 
Hoop Scheffer stated that “no matter how many members NATO may have, the Alliance will 
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 continue to fully honor our commitments to Russia, and to view Russia as a strategic partner. I 
think the word ‘engagement’ is, and should be, the key word for NATO and Russia.” 186 By 
acknowledging Russia as a strategic partner and placing emphasis on engaging the nation, 
NATO raised Russia’s standing from lesser rival to equal partner. Despite Russia’s wavering 
image and actions, which cause NATO member states trepidation about the rising power of the 
nation, the Alliance still offered a theoretical partnership that includes equality and is proactive 
in its relationship with Russia. While de Hoop Scheffer’s statements at the seminar offered a 
different image of NATO to Russia and those involved in the NATO-Russia Council, it may be 
important to note that the seminar was located in Saint Petersburg, Russia; so, an aggressive and 
critical demeanor might not be the right choice while visiting the nation. 
 NATO continued to honor its commitment to the NATO-Russia Council, despite not 
always agreeing on all decisions. At the April 2008 meeting of the NATO-Russia Council, De 
Hoop Scheffer recognized the multi-faceted relationship between Russia and the NATO allies, 
but he also stated that NATO is willing to work toward a better understanding with this strategic 
partner. De Hoop Scheffer asserted that “at our meeting this morning we will take stock of our 
commonalities, but also seek ways to intensify the process of finding political denominators on 
the issues on which we do not agree.” 187 NATO will not let disagreements between the parties 
hinder their relationship with Russia. De Hoop Scheffer acknowledged the progress that the 
NATO-Russia Council has made since its inception, calling the partnership an “essential, 
strategic bridge across Europe.” 188 The Alliance showed itself as committed to its participation 
in the NATO-Russia Council and any engagement with its strategic Russian partner. 
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 Other NATO Images 
Cold War anti-Communist opponent 
 The works of NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division, more specifically its branding 
strategy, culminate not only in its authoritarian, critical image toward Russia, but also end in the 
creation of other NATO representations. Then-Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy 
Jean Fournet observed in August 2007 that  
I think that we speak, maybe, in a more neutral way of NATO and specifically to those 
countries that have still difficulty to view NATO as something else but a relic of the Cold 
War. And I think coming with scientific programs, for instance how to help them connect 
to the Internet, that’s very important and positively viewed, how to build a facility to get 
rid of pesticide or to get rid of chemicals that have been left over after the demise of the 
Soviet Union. 189 
 
He discerned that NATO was still seen by some countries to be the Cold War anti-Communist 
opponent, though this view is changing with the humanitarian and scientific programs that 
NATO brings to these nations. The countries engaged by NATO and whose view of the 
organization still reflects the Cold War image may include former Soviet Bloc countries. The 
acceptance of a new NATO image by these countries through the organization’s public 
diplomacy efforts shows that NATO’s engagement and relationship with a former Soviet 
opponent can end positively; the Alliance can achieve a different image that will be accepted by 
the targeted nation and/or publics. 
 NATO Spokesman James Appathurai also acknowledged the Alliance’s continued image 
as the Cold War anti-Communist opponent. He, too, recognized the importance of public 
diplomacy efforts in shirking this image. Appathurai asserted that “we…need to do more in 
terms of explaining what the new NATO is. If I talk to my mother, she still thinks of NATO in 
Cold War terms.” 190 He stressed that changing this image is the duty of NATO nations, 
explaining why the Alliance is important and relevant to the security of all populations. The only 
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 way to rid NATO of its Cold War image is for NATO members to proactively work together 
through new public diplomacy strategies as well as reach out to and engage with their strategic 
publics and integral partners, such as Russia. 
Humanitarian and scientific leader 
 Another projected image of NATO is one of humanitarian and scientific leader. Through 
the organization’s public diplomacy efforts, NATO reaches out to civil society – including 
journalists, parliamentarians, and the scientific community. Then Assistant Secretary General of 
the Public Diplomacy Division Jean Fournet observed in 2007 that 
NATO is a political and military organization for collective security. So it's not meant for 
development. It's not meant for promoting science and so on and so forth. But science is a 
tool that every big organization must have. And even if it is limited in scope, and even if 
it is limited in budget, we bring together scientists, we develop collaborative activities. 191 
 
Although NATO was originally created for security purposes, Fournet discerned that reaching 
out to civil society produces opportunities for humanitarian and scientific development. He 
stated that networking between NATO, the scientific community, and foreign publics not only 
brings progress to the targeted region, but also improves the relationship with that region. 
Fournet observed that “touching target audiences [means] having a possibility to engage in 
dialogue, and dialogue with trust and confidence.” 192 Thus, NATO’s networking with other 
entities, such as the scientific community, may help create a positive image for the organization 
while cementing a trustful and confident relationship with the target audience.  
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 VIII: DISCUSSION 
NATO’s Branding Strategy from 2002-2003 
 I discovered six emerging themes from NATO publications and speech during this time 
period. The emerging themes derived from the 2002-2003 NATO speech and publications 
include the following: the NATO-Russia Council, the NATO-Russia Partnership, Transparency, 
Positive NATO Image, NATO vs. Russia, and NATO’s Public Diplomacy. These themes mainly 
focused on a positive and proactive NATO-Russia relationship, yet also demeaned Russian 
concerns. Officials such as NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Rizzo affirmed a 
better venue for cooperation and dialogue in the NATO-Russia Council. The organization 
stressed that the new NATO-Russia relationship would be based on mutual trust, transparency, 
and shared responsibilities. Yet, while the Alliance took pride in the new partnership and 
interoperability of forces through the NATO-Russia Council, the organization still harkened back 
to Russia’s Communist past and demeaned the nation’s concerns regarding NATO enlargement. 
Although there were some negative aspects in NATO’s communication, the overall tone of the 
Alliance’s branding strategy was positive. 
 The NATO-Russia Council theme focused on the new group as a venue for cooperation, a 
working and proactive relationship, and equality. Previous NATO-Russia relationships, such as 
the Permanent Joint Council, did not give Russia equal footing and did not foster open dialogue. 
NATO officials stressed that the newly-founded NATO-Russia Council would be based on 
mutual trust, transparency and shared responsibilities. By shirking any images of the unequal 
Permanent Joint Council, the Alliance could stress to Russia the differences in the NATO-Russia 
Council. Russia would no longer be a “subordinate nonmember,” but would be a full and equal 
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 member in the NRC. NATO projected a positive image of itself as well as of the NRC toward 
Russia in order to entice the nation into involvement.  
 The NATO-Russia Partnership theme focused on the new era of the Alliance’s 
relationship with Russia. NATO stressed that the Cold War years were over, Russia had 
changed, and a new partnership could take place. The term “new era” suggests that this new 
NATO-Russian relationship would be long-term. As a long-term relationship, the Alliance also 
focused on the NATO-Russia partnership as an investment. Both NATO and Russia would 
benefit from working together. NATO officials branded the organization and Russia with images 
of strength and power, positive images for both parties. With Russia as a changed nation and 
NATO as a cooperative and trusting partner, this theme portrays the new partnership in a positive 
light. 
 The Transparency theme focused on NATO gaining trust from Russia and the 
interoperability of their forces. Cooperation between both parties can only be accomplished 
through transparency and openness. NATO officials stressed the importance of open, two-way 
communication in order for the NATO-Russia Council to flourish. Yet, the Alliance also 
respected the independence and individuality of nations such as Russia, observing that 
individuality with transparency would create a formidable partnership. NATO also stressed the 
importance of transparency in the interoperability of NATO-Russian forces. By discussing joint 
participation in international security programs as well as both parties’ commitment to open and 
sustained dialogue, NATO projected a positive image of the NRC as well as of NATO. 
 While some themes indirectly portray the Alliance and the NATO-Russia Council in a 
positive light, through their ideals and behaviors regarding Russia, one theme specifically deals 
with the Positive NATO Image. NATO’s positive image focuses on the experienced NATO, the 
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 “victory” of NATO enlargement, and the Alliance’s position as an integral partner for Russia. As 
an established and experienced international organization, NATO portrays itself positively 
toward Russia and the rest of Europe. NATO officials observed that Russia’s partnership has 
helped the Alliance to overcome Europe’s division. Through its relationships, NATO has 
achieved its original intention of maintaining peace and security in Europe as well as overcoming 
the power of the Soviet Union and the Cold War. NATO’s experience has also helped the 
organization to aid and foster new democracies in Europe through enlargement. The Alliance has 
focused on these aspects to present itself to Russia as a hot commodity and integral partner. Not 
only has the Alliance helped other nations, but it has also helped Russia be accepted back into 
the European community. Focusing on NATO’s achievements is a positive aspect to its branding 
strategy. 
 Yet, NATO’s speech regarding Russia was not all positive. The NATO vs. Russia theme 
presents aspects such as Russia’s Communist past, NATO alienating Russia, NATO protecting 
democracy and international security, and demeaning Russia’s concerns about NATO 
enlargement. While these aspects demonstrate NATO’s negativity toward and about Russia, they 
mainly show NATO in a negative light. Frequently referring to Russia’s Communist past gives 
Russia a negative connotation in NATO and the European community. These references alienate 
Russia and make the nation feel yet again as an “other.” NATO’s on its own accomplishments 
and goals toward protecting democracy and international security may infer that Russia must 
prove itself in its partnership with the Alliance. Russia’s relationship with NATO is further 
jeopardized by the Alliance demeaning its concerns about NATO enlargement. All of these 
factors, while meant to make Russia look bad, only present NATO in a negative way. While not 
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 part of NATO’s official branding strategy, this language does contribute to the Alliance’s overall 
image. 
 The theme of NATO’s Public Diplomacy is also part of the organization’s branding 
strategy. NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division was created to portray NATO’s commitment to 
positive communication as well as demonstrate the need for a new NATO image. The Alliance’s 
commitment to positive communication not only included communication with governments, but 
also with foreign publics, such as the Russian people. NATO’s emphasis on improving public 
diplomacy was to better present its transformation while informing the public about its broad 
agenda. By opening communication with its partners and foreign publics, the Alliance might 
show itself in a more positive and friendly light. NATO’s branding strategy toward Russia in the 
early years of the NRC (2002-2003), portrayed a NATO that has learned from its past mistakes 
in the Permanent Joint Council and other skeptical pursuits; the Alliance portrayed itself toward 
Russia as a proactive, responsibility-sharing partner that was open and more trusting of the 
nation. 
NATO’s Branding Strategy from 2004-2005 
  I discovered five emerging themes from NATO publications and speech during this time 
period. The emerging themes derived from the 2004-2005 NATO speech and publications 
include the following: NATO’s Public Diplomacy, Positive NATO Image, Negative NATO 
Image, NATO vs. Russia, and the NATO-Russia Partnership. These themes continued to show a 
mainly positive image of the Alliance. As the NATO-Russia Council continued its open dialogue 
and included participation of both parties in peacekeeping activities, the strength of the 
partnership increased. The organization focused on its original goals and the shared values of 
NATO and Russia. Some negative aspects of NATO’s image, including focus on Russia’s 
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 shortcomings and actions, persisted but not to the extent of previous years. NATO’s branding 
strategy maintained an overall positive tone in its relationship with Russia in the NRC. 
 The theme of NATO’s Public Diplomacy focused on transparency in its communication, 
NATO’s long-term relationship with the Russian public, and its relationships with other publics. 
The Alliance’s commitment to positive communication from the 2002-2003 period sustained the 
organization through these relationships. NATO continued to reach out to the public and explain 
the purpose and actions of the organization, even involving young people in one of its Summit 
meetings. By encouraging the public to participate in NATO events, the organization improved 
its transparency efforts. NATO also improved its long-term relationship with the Russian public. 
Through the NATO Information Office in Moscow, NATO was able to explain its operations 
and decisions directly with the Russian people. This open dialogue fostered a long-term 
relationship in the nation. The Alliance’s involvement with other publics, such as the Georgian 
people, demonstrated NATO’s commitment to all of its relationships. While all of these aspects 
of NATO’s public diplomacy present the organization as a positive supporter and active 
communicator, they also demonstrate NATO’s relevance and importance in international 
politics. 
 The theme of a Positive NATO Image emphasized NATO’s abilities, NATO as a reward 
or incentive, and NATO as an integral partner for Russia. Officials from the organization 
featured NATO’s adaptability, stamina, and readiness for new challenges. NATO’s 
establishment as a core international institution gives it experience in such areas, a positive factor 
and enticement for Russian partnership. The Alliance also portrayed itself as a reward or 
incentive to other countries vying for NATO membership. NATO officials stressed its open door 
policy and goal at transatlantic security. These values also portray NATO as an integral partner 
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 for Russia. In addition to its improved communication efforts, NATO supported Russia through 
its crises and hardships, such as the Beslan tragedies, and defended the NATO-Russian 
relationship to other questioning nations. NATO’s behavior and actions regarding its abilities 
and relationships continued to emphasize a positive image in its branding strategy. 
 The theme of the Negative NATO Image included views on NATO enlargement. Russian 
trepidation over new views of the nation from former Soviet states gave NATO a slightly 
negative image. Yet, NATO or any other organization cannot project a negative image toward a 
specific audience, so the Negative NATO Image theme really focuses on NATO’s negative 
comments about the nation. A NATO with a more finely tuned “Russian radar” might not be an 
attractive ally for the nation. Such anxieties could be exacerbated by the organization’s negative 
Russian views, as depicted in the NATO vs. Russia theme. In this area, NATO focused on 
Russia’s shortcomings, such as its less-than-exceptional participation in any NATO-led 
operations. The Alliance was also critical of Russian actions. The nation’s military presence in 
former Soviet territories caused backlash from NATO. While the organization meant to lessen 
Russia’s image, NATO’s own image became more negative because of its critical language. 
 Yet, NATO’s branding strategy continued to work toward improving NATO’s image as 
seen in the NATO-Russia Partnership theme, which encompassed Russian participation, 
terrorism, and how the two parties worked together. NATO officials described Russian 
participation in the NATO-Russia Council and other endeavors as result-oriented practical 
cooperation and emphasized open political dialogue. Yet, Russia not only participated in 
cooperative agreements, but the nation also engaged NATO in political debate. Through such 
dialogue and debate, the NATO-Russia partnership could grow stronger. The incorporation of 
terrorism into NATO-Russian relations also strengthened the partnership. NATO spokesmen 
85 
 confirmed Russia’s participation in anti-terrorism programs and other operations geared toward 
transatlantic security. The NATO-Russia Council fostered trust and cooperation, and willingness 
to meet each other half way so that the two parties could work together in a proactive way. By 
working together in an open and proactive relationship, NATO displayed a positive image. 
NATO’s Branding Strategy from 2006-2008 
 I discovered five emerging themes from NATO publications and speech during this time 
period. The emerging themes derived from the 2006-2008 NATO speech and publications 
include the following: NATO-Russia Partnership, NATO vs. Russia, NATO’s Public Diplomacy, 
Positive NATO Image, and Other NATO Images. Throughout the course of the NATO-Russia 
relationship, the Alliance has stressed the importance of maintaining security on the European 
continent. The organization frequently mentioned on its website and in its publications the 
interoperability of NATO-Russian forces and shared participation in security projects and 
missions. From the interactions of the NRC, NATO projected a positive image as a stable factor 
in transatlantic security. This positive image is reflective of its current branding strategy. 
 Yet, over this time period, the NATO-Russia relationship has also regressed due to 
conflicting views on Russia’s dealings with Georgia. Russia’s admonishment from the NATO 
allies implicates the nation as dissenting from NATO security principles. The Alliance becomes 
an authority figure against Russia. Thus, NATO’s branding strategy toward Russia has regressed 
to a more critical and skeptical nature. While NATO spokesman James Appathurai stated that the 
Alliance did not want a direct role in the conflict between Russia and Georgia, NATO’s call for 
Russia to respect the international values and principles upon which the international security 
system is based branded the organization as a critical authority figure. Yet again, NATO wants to 
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 foster an equal and proactive relationship with Russia through the NRC, but only when the 
nation acts in accordance with NATO and international security principles. 
 The theme of the NATO-Russia Partnership discusses the importance of maintaining 
security and NATO’s improvement in communication efforts. NATO officials observed that the 
NATO-Russia relationship has two-way benefits, if both parties work together to foster and 
maintain security on the continent. NATO enlargement also plays a role in improvement of 
security; the increase of democratic nations on the continent may help NATO in its security 
efforts. Despite the Alliance’s success in enlargement, the organization still needed to improve 
its communication efforts. NATO officials called for more transparency, open communication, 
and confidence-building. While NATO’s partnerships remained secure, the Alliance admitted 
that improvements must be made to maintain transatlantic security. Admitting flaws and 
conducting improvements may give NATO a positive image in its branding strategy. 
 NATO’s stance toward Russia became more critical and authoritarian, as evidenced by 
the NATO vs. Russia theme. The organization’s critical nature also showed itself as an authority 
figure, as well as making demands from Russia. NATO’s formal directions to Russia included 
telling Russia to respect international values and principles, calling for a Russian ceasefire, and 
demanding the removal of Russian forces from South Ossetia. These demands from NATO give 
the organization an authoritarian image, demonstrating its shift in branding strategy. 
 NATO’s Public Diplomacy theme exhibits the Alliance’s need to improve it 
communication skills, including explaining NATO to the Russian public and improving its 
credibility. NATO officials emphasized a changing and imperfect NATO, which must be 
portrayed and explained to the Russian people in order to maintain a positive relationship. Not 
only is open dialogue and transparency needed in improving communication skills, but 
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 credibility is needed as well. The Alliance stressed the importance of linking words with actions 
to maintain credibility. By making these improvements and once again acknowledging flaws in 
the NATO-Russia relationship, the Alliance may improve its image. 
 While becoming more critical of Russia, NATO tried to improve its own image, as 
evidenced in the Positive NATO Image theme. This theme includes the stability of NATO, 
NATO’s belief in equality, and NATO honoring its commitments to Russia. NATO officials 
focused on the Alliance’s stability through operations, missions, and partnerships. NATO’s 
operations and missions have created thorough knowledge and capabilities in political dialogue. 
The Alliance’s knowledge and capabilities also encompass its belief in equality, encouraging 
more democracy, more stability, and more security. Despite NATO’s critical stance toward 
Russia, the organization implements its beliefs by honoring its commitments to Russia as a 
strategic partner. While contradictory in some of its actions, NATO still attempts to maintain its 
positive image. 
 The last theme discovered in the NATO publications is Other NATO Images. The 
organization still retains the image of Cold War anti-Communist opponent in some areas. NATO 
officials see the need to explain what the new NATO is to foreign publics as well as engage and 
form relationships with former Soviet nations to promote the organization. Other images of the 
Alliance include humanitarian and scientific leader. NATO’s public diplomacy efforts extend to 
bring together civil society and the scientific community to improve NATO’s relationships in 
various regions. While NATO’s Cold War image can be negative, its humanitarian and scientific 
image is positive and can bring together several groups of people together in a positive way.  
 In conclusion, NATO portrayed itself in the NRC as a partner and ally of Russia in the 
discussion, deliberation, and action toward transatlantic security issues. Hunter, Rogov, and 
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 Oliker state that it is in their mutual interest that “NATO and Russia should forge a new 
relationship based on genuine partnership that can help to provide lasting security for all nations 
in Eurasia and that can hasten Russia’s integration into the family of democratic, market-oriented 
nations.”193 In order to maintain stable and equal relations, NATO and Russia must incorporate 
transparency and new mechanisms for resolving differences in their daily actions. The two 
parties must also recognize their dependence on each other to accomplish vital security tasks and 
to meet Euro-Atlantic needs. Russia’s trust in NATO and the dependability of their alliance helps 
increase and maintain an overall sense of European and transatlantic security. 
 The NATO-Russia Council must incorporate mutual trust, understanding, and partnership 
in order to continue its relationship. As Wang stated, “managing national reputation is not just 
about projecting a certain national image but rather negotiating understanding with foreign 
publics.”194 In order to foster its relationship with Russia and maintain security in the 
transatlantic region, NATO must negotiate understanding with the Russian government and 
people. Russia may not become a full member of the Alliance, but negotiations in the NATO-
Russia Council should engage the nation and allow them more say and responsibility in the 
relationship. By incorporating these strategic communication practices, NATO may improve its 
image and reputation toward its Russian and Eastern European target audiences. 
Limitations 
 Limitations of this study include what access to NATO documents I was granted. I was 
not able to obtain classified documents such as NATO’s Public Diplomacy Strategy, Stefanie 
Babst’s internally-published article entitled, “Reinventing NATO’s Public Diplomacy,” or 
interviews with any NATO officials. This thesis analyzes specific NATO publications as they 
focused on the NATO-Russian relationship, using the time periods of 2002-2003, 2004-2005, 
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 and 2006-2008. These time periods exhibit the gradual change in image and branding strategy of 
NATO to Russia. One limitation is that this thesis analyzes only the time period relating to the 
NATO-Russia Council. It does not consider the NATO-Russian relationship during the decade of 
Boris Yeltsin’s presidency. Another limitation is the fact that this is basically a study of one-way 
communication from NATO to Russia and does not measure the perceptions of NATO and the 
NRC from the Russian side; there was no content analysis of Russian media or Russian official 
documents. Limited evidence indicated the specific disclosure of the NATO-Russia relationship 
to a select number of NATO officials and its discussion at NATO press conferences, in speeches, 
interviews, and written in articles.  
 Future studies could also include more researchers and the introduction of different 
methods of coding and even new themes found in the text. Further study of this subject could 
include conducting interviews with NATO officials and/or staff regarding NATO’s image and 
the NATO-Russia Council. Shared narratives, such as conducted interviews, can illuminate both 
the past and present, while giving a more personalized view of the NATO-Russia relationship 
and the Alliance’s branding strategy. Relating this study to NATO’s change in policy toward 
Russia could also be interesting future research. Researchers could also look into obtaining 
access to the “classified” documents that I could not obtain. Such access would require study of 
EU freedom of information legislation as well as the process for requesting such documents from 
NATO. The NATO Archives, which deal with the public disclosure of NATO information, may 
be reached at http://www.nato.int/archives as well as Tel. (32-2) 707.4220.195 More in-depth 
study of NATO’s process for requesting and retrieving classified information may be found in 
the document entitled, “Safeguarding Classified NATO Information.”196 The timeline for 
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 requesting and obtaining classified information is unknown, but is most likely at the discretion of 
the NATO archivist. 
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